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The Making of an Antitrust Law: The Pending
Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China
H. Stephen Harris, Jr.
1. INTRODUCTION
Though many jurisdictions have adopted competition laws in recent
decades, none of these laws has engendered the level of interest sparked by
China's proposed Anti-Monopoly Law ("AML'). Several factors have combined
to inspire an unprecedented flow of commentary and consortia on each iteration
of China's draft AML. These factors include the sheer scale and astounding
growth of China's markets, the vast amounts of foreign capital recently invested
in China, the burgeoning sales of Chinese goods abroad, the substantial growth
in the participation of Chinese firms in foreign markets, and a recognition of the
significant challenge posed by the establishment of free market competition in
China's socialist market economy. To China's great credit, the State Council,1 the
Ministry of Commerce ("MOFCOM"), 2 the National Development and Reform
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The ChicagoJournal of InternationalLaw expresses no opinion as to the accuracy of this Article's
Chinese citations and references.
The State Council is the "highest executive organ of State power" and of "State administration."
Regarding the State Council's functions and organizations, see generally the State Council website,
available online at <http://english.gov.cn/inks/statecouncil.htm> (visited May 7, 2006).
MOFCOM is a ministry under the State Council. For information regarding the organization and
functions of MOFCOM, see generally the MOFCOM website, available online at
<http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/> (visited May 7, 2006).
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Commission ("NDRC"),3 and the State Administration for Industry and
Commerce ("SAIC") 4 have solicited and studied numerous sets of comments
from public and private organizations, companies, and academic experts around
the world. The language of the draft AML pending before the National People's
Congress ("NPC") has incorporated many of these useful comments.
However, concerns about the current draft remain. Broadly speaking,
China's economy presents three principal features raising competition concerns:
so-called local blockage or regional monopolies;5 sectoral monopolies by
Chinese firms, including state-owned enterprises ("SOEs'); and a perception of
alleged abuses of dominant positions by some foreign multinationals. Earlier
drafts of the proposed AML contained a chapter prohibiting so-called
administrative monopolies, which are typically large "local champions" protected
from competition by local and regional government bodies. The elimination of
that chapter from the November 11, 2005 Draft AML ("Current Draft AML" or
"November 2005 Draft AML") 6 essentially exempts such anticompetitive
conduct from the reach of the Anti-Monopoly Law.
Another recent revision to Article 2 of the Current Draft AML has
subordinated the Anti-Monopoly Law to administrative laws and regulations that
cover specific industries or sectors of the economy. A related revision to Article
38 of the AML gives sectoral and industrial organs of the State Council the
initial authority to investigate and apply special sectoral regulations to alleged
anticompetitive conduct in industries and sectors governed by such special laws
and regulations. The revision also allows these organs of the State Council to
report the outcome of their investigations to the Anti-Monopoly Law
3

Regarding the general functions and organization of the NDRC, see generally the NDRC website,
available online at <http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/> (visited May 7, 2006).

4

SAIC is an organization directly under the State Council. For additional information regarding the
functions and organization of SAIC, see generally the SAIC website, available online in Chinese at
<http://www.saic.gov.cn> (Chinese) (visited May 7, 2006).

5

See the discussion of regional blockage in Xue Zheng Wang, Challenges/Obstacles Faced by
Competition Authorities in Achieving Greater Economic Development through the Promotion of Competition,
(2004), available online at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/51/23727203.pdf> (visited May
7, 2006). The author elaborates upon the serious problems that arise when local governments
block competitive products produced externally from entering their markets, in part because tax
revenue collected on products is shared by the local government where production is located.
Although the Unfair Competition Law prohibited such local blockage, those provisions have not
been effectively enforced. Id at 2-3. See also Wang Shaoguang, The Rise of Regions: FiscalReform and
the Decline of Central State Capacity in China, in Andrew G. Walder, ed, The Waning of the Communist
State: Economic Organs of PolticalDecline in China and Hungary 109 (Berkeley 1995) ("Because power
and resources are dispersed, the exercise of central control now depends to a large extent upon
the consent of the sub-national units whose actions are slipping from central control.").
An unofficial English translation of the November 2005 Draft AML ("Current Draft AML') is

6

on file with the author.
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Enforcement Authority (the "Anti-Monopoly Authority," "Anti-Monopoly Law
Enforcement Authority," or "Authority").' Only in the event that such organs
fail to conduct an investigation may the Authority initiate an investigation. Even
under these circumstances, the Authority must consult with the relevant sectoral
and industrial organs of the State Council. These changes pose a severe
impediment to applying the Anti-Monopoly Law to many significant industries
and economic sectors of the Chinese economy.
As a consequence of these revisions, enforcement efforts will, at least
initially, likely focus on foreign companies. The insulation of broad swaths of the
Chinese economy from equal application of transparent competition rules risks
depriving Chinese consumers of the benefits of market competition and may
disincentivize continued foreign investment in China.
Certain substantive provisions in the Current Draft AML appear to be
inconsistent with international norms of competition law. Foremost among
these is a vague article stating that an "abuse" of intellectual property ("IP")
rights resulting in the elimination or restriction of competition is subject to
sanctions under the law. The absence of any definition of what conduct may
constitute such an abuse of IP rights, and the possible imposition of compulsory
licensing as a remedy, have engendered expressions of great concern, especially
from foreign high technology companies with substantial operations or sales in
China. The May 2005 Draft AML's elimination of an article establishing
compulsory access to network and infrastructure (the so-called "essential facility
provision")' may alleviate some of these concerns.
A potentially significant procedural issue may arise from another recently
revised provision that places the principal antitrust enforcement entity, the AntiMonopoly Authority, under the aegis of three government entities: the State
Council, MOFCOM, and SAIC. This enforcement approach may cause
interagency conflicts while creating inconsistencies and inefficiencies in policy
development; administrative practices; and enforcement procedures, standards,
and decisions.

7

8

Drafts leading up to the Current Draft AML usually referred to an "Anti-Monopoly Authority,"
which, in context, appeared to be the sole competition policy and enforcement agency under the
AML. The Current Draft AML has introduced a new structure, as discussed in Section II.H
below, that includes an "Anti-Monopoly Committee" under the State Council. Under this
proposed law, the Anti-Monopoly Committee will formulate policies and direct the activities of
the newly-named "Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority." As the new name indicates, the
"Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority" will be charged with investigating cases involving
legal violations. The Authority will also be responsible for proposing and publishing rules and
regulations related to the underlying goals of the Anti-Monopoly Law.
Current Draft AML, art 48 (cited in note 6).
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Notwithstanding these serious grounds for concern, the Current Draft
AML contains many features that are basically consistent with international
norms, including provisions that create a modern merger review regime,
proscribe abuses of a dominant position, and prohibit joint conduct such as
price fixing and market allocation. Implementing regulations could elaborate
upon the new agency's substantive interpretation of some of the vague and more
sweeping provisions in the draft AML and explain the agency's intended
procedural approach to enforcement. Under the applicable rules, the proposed
draft AML must be submitted to the Standing Committee of the NPC for three
readings.9 As of this writing, the first of these readings is expected to take place
in June 2006.1' Although no precise timetable has been set for subsequent
readings (and there is no guarantee of passage during the NPC's 2006 session),
many informed commentators have indicated that the AML will likely be
enacted by the end of this session." Other commentators privately express
doubts that the law can be enacted within the coming year, in part due to
continuing internal disputes about whether the AML should address regional
blockage and sectoral monopolies.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CONTEXT AND HISTORY
BEHIND THE DRAFTING OF THE ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW

In the early 1960s, Deng Xiaopeng declaimed his quintessential maxim of
pragmatic economics: "Whether a cat is black or white makes no difference. As
long as it catches mice, it is a good cat." To address the great famines caused by
Mao's failed "Great Leap Forward" policies, Deng turned collectivist farms over
to individual peasants. His proposals calling for free markets for farmers resulted
in his denunciation as a "capitalist roader," and he was placed under house arrest
and exiled. After surviving other purges, Deng and his supporters gained power
in 1978, two years after Mao's death. Deng almost immediately abolished rural
agricultural communes, allowing peasants to cultivate family plots. Harvests
grew rapidly, and by 1984, China had become self-sufficient in food for the first
time in modern history. Deng also pursued other policies of economic
liberalization, including allowing urban Chinese to open small businesses and

9

10
11

For a general overview of the deliberative and legislative process within the NPC, see the China
Internet Information Center, available online at <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/
legislative/75857.htm> (visited May 7, 2006).
See NPC 2006 Legislative Schedule, available online at <http://www.uschina.org/public/
documents/2006/01/2006-npc-legislative-schedule.html> (visited May 7, 2006).
See generally Nation May Introduce Anti-Monopoy Law, China View (Dec 30, 2005), available online
at <http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/newsrelease/significanmews/200512/200512012425
02.html> (visited May 7, 2006).
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purchase commercial goods. He encouraged Chinese youth to study abroad and
opened China to foreign investments, albeit with required participation and
control by Chinese joint venture partners.12
These policies and many subsequent structural reforms have been pursued
in an avowed effort to transform China's centrally planned economy, dominated
by state-owned enterprises, to a system that embodies free-market characteristics
but retains certain socialist attributes. 3 The reforms were accompanied by
legislative enactments. First proposed by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, the Enterprise
Act was enacted in 1988, punctuated by monitory assurances that factories
would no longer be able to depend on state support and would face bankruptcy
if they failed to adapt to market competition. 4 The law was described as moving
away from direct control of government departments over industries toward a
system in which "the state regulates the market, which in turn guides the
enterprises,' ' 15 in part by making managers responsible for profits and losses. 6
Since the advent of the Enterprise Act, however, it is broadly agreed that
entrenched government monopolies and local and regional protectionism have
hampered any wholesale transition to market competition.
These steps toward liberalizing the Chinese economy, coupled with
investment attracted by the large and growing Chinese middle-class market, have
spawned the astonishing economic boon of recent decades. The agricultural
segment of the Chinese economy plunged from approximately half of GDP in
1979 (as officially measured by China) to about 15 percent of GDP in 2002.1' By
12

See generally Richard Evans, Deng Xiaoping and the Making ofModern China (Penguin 1995).

13

For a general discussion of this "hybrid" economic model and possible explanations for China's
rejection of a wholesale adoption of a market-style economy based on full private property rights,
see generally Lan Cao, The Cat that Catches Mice: China's Challenge to the Dominant PrivatiZaionModel,
21 Brooklyn J Intl L 97 (1995). Regarding unique challenges presented by the establishment of a
competition law regime in a transitional economy, see Bing Song, Competition Poliq in a Transiional
Economy: The Case of China, 31 StanJ Ind L 387 (1995). The Chinese Constitution was amended in
1988 and 1999 to incorporate the concept of a "socialist market economy" rather than "economic
planning." See PRC Const, art 15, as amended by amend 1 (Apr 12, 1988); PRC Const, preamble
7, as amended by amend 3 (Mar 15, 1999); PRC Const, art 11, as amended by amend 3 (Mar 15,
1999). A copy of the official English translation of the Chinese Constitution, as amended, is
available online at <http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html> (visited May
7, 2006).
See generally Mark E. Monfort, Reform of the State-Owned Enteqrpise and the Bankrupty Law in the
People's Republic of China, 22 Okla City U L Rev 1067 (1997).

14

15

16
17

China Enacts Law Giving More Power to Entetpises, AP (Aug 1, 1988), quoting Zhang Yanning,
Deputy Minister of the State Commission for Restructuring the Economy.
Id.
See Profile of the Chinese Economy, Economist Intelligence Unit, available online at
<http://www.economist.com/countries/China/profile.cfm?folder=Profile-Economic%20
Structure> (visited May 7, 2006).

Summer 2006

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

that year, the industrial sector had grown to account for over 51 percent of
GDP and services comprised over 30 percent of GDP.18 The SOEs' dominance
in the industrial sector waned markedly from 1979 to 2002 with the advent of
new ventures in various forms, including township and village enterprises
("TVEs"), purely private entrepreneurships, and foreign investors entering the
market through joint ventures or direct means."
Efforts to reform the SOEs were sparked by their poor economic
performance. 2' Losses by SOEs grew tremendously during the late 1980s and
21
early 1990s, and by early 1994, 50.1 percent of SOEs were running at a loss.
Estimates vary, but the share of industrial output represented by SOEs has
remained at approximately one-third throughout the past decade. Although the
"1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law" was enacted in 1988, and was applicable to
SOEs, it did not stem the tide of failing SOEs or result in the privatization of
any marked portion of the remaining, entrenched SOEs. 2 Efforts, begun in
1994, to draft a new bankruptcy law have still not borne fruit.23 In short, despite
much exhortation and some structural reforms, SOEs have continued to hamper
China's economic growth. A large percentage of these entities have not, in any
24
meaningful sense, been transitioned into participants in the market economy.
During this economic transition, the formerly robust relationship between the
government and SOEs has weakened, and money-losing SOEs have been
bankrupted or privatized. However, many of the largest and most profitable
SOEs have been retained
in state hands and represent a substantial share of the
2s
economy.
Chinese
Serious discussions about enacting a competition law have taken place
since at least the mid-1980s, especially among political leaders and legal scholars
who early on viewed a competition law as an essential element for transforming
SOEs into private enterprises with the ability to compete effectively. As early as
1988, lawmakers considered incorporating antitrust principles into what would
18
19

20

Id.
Id.
Guanghua Yu, Using Western Law to Improve China'sState-Owned Enterprises:Of Takeovers and Securities
Fraud,39 Valp U L Rev 339, 339-41 (2004).

21

Id.

22

Neal Stevens, Note and Comment, Confronting the Crisis of Insolvency in China's State-Owned

23

Enterprises:Can the ProposedBankruptgy Law Erase the Red Ink?, 16 Wis Int L J 551, 551-53 (1998).
See Charles Booth, DraftingBankruptiy Laws in SocialistMarket Economies: Recent Developments in China

24

and Vietnam, 18 Colum J Asian L 93 (2005).
See generally Xinqiang Sun, Reform of China's State-OwnedEnterprises:A Legal Perpective, 31 St Mary's

25

LJ 19 (1999).
See Dali L. Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan, Market Transition and the Poliics of Governance in
China 31-37 (Stanford 2004).
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become the Anti-Unfair Competition Law of 1993 ("UCL").2 6 Indeed, Articles 6
and 7 of the UCL expressly prohibit public and private monopolists from
"forcing" purchases of commodities or "prohibit[ing] competition from other
enterprises." Article 11 prohibits sales below cost with the purpose of driving
competitors out of business (subject to certain exceptions). Article 12 prohibits
tying. Collusion in bidding is forbidden by Article 15. Nevertheless, as enacted
and enforced, the UCL was essentially limited to the protection of trademarks
and "passing off' offenses,27 primarily because counterfeit goods were seen as
the most pressing issue prompting repeated complaints from various countries,
including the US. Efforts to include any "core" antitrust content in the statute
were considered unnecessary and ultimately abandoned, at least in part because
of disagreements over which agency or agencies would implement and enforce
such laws.28
The Company Law, enacted in 1993 and made effective in 1994, sought to
establish and harness property rights in order to induce enterprises to compete
more effectively and efficiently, with an ultimate goal of fostering a competitive
market structure.29 Work toward a comprehensive antitrust law began in earnest
in 1993, when China established a group comprised of officials from SAIC and
the State Economic and Trade Commission ("SETC") to study the antimonopoly laws of other jurisdictions and begin work on a draft Anti-Monopoly
Law of China. 30 From the outset, the working group received comments and
support from both antitrust agencies in major jurisdictions-including the US,
Germany, Japan, Australia, and South Korea-and international organizations
like the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD"),
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ("APEC"), the United Nations

26

Anti-Unfair Competition Law (Sept 2, 1993), translated in China L & Prac 31 (Nov 18, 1993).

27

See generally Paul B. Birden, Jr., Trademark Protection in China: Trends and Directions, 18 Loyola LA
Intl & Comp L J 431, 447-49 (1996); Derek Devgun, CrossborderJoint Ventures: A Survf of
InternationalAntitrust Considerations,21 Wm Mitchell L Rev 681, 688-90 (1996) (stating that the
Anti-Unfair Competition Law was passed "[i]n response to a US threat to impose trade sanctions
on China because of its failure to protect US investors' intellectual property rights").
Bei Hu, China Unveils Competition Rules; Observers Fear PoliticalResistance May Delay Implementation of
the Count/'s FirstAntitrust Law, South China Morning Post 1 (July 2, 2003); Youngjin Jung and
Qian Hao, The New Economic Constitution in China:A Third Way for Competition Regime?, 24 Nw J Intl
L & Bus 107, 112-13 (2003) (noting "intense opposition" to inclusion of anti-monopoly
regulations and arguments by some that such a law during the transition to a market economy
would be "anachronistic").
See Monfort, 22 Okla City U L Rev at 1095 (cited in note 14).

28

29
30

See Wang Xiaoye, Issues Surrounding the Drafting of China'sAnti-Monopoly Law, 3 Wash U Global
Studies L Rev 285 (2004). See also Law and Order Government Offiials to Draft AntimonopoLy Law,
New China News Agency, pt 3 (Jan 19, 1995).
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Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD"), and the World Bank.3
Reports of cartel activity within numerous industrial32 sectors in the late 1990s
broadened the perceived need for antitrust legislation.
In 1997, China enacted its Price Law, which became effective in 1998 and
sought to establish a new pricing system "compatible with the requirements of a
socialist market economy. 3 3 While the law technically outlaws price-fixing and
states that businesses may set their prices, in practice it provides for price
controls and direction by local agencies empowered to enforce the law to serve
goals other than ensuring free competition. While the Price Law was being
enacted, the draft Anti-Monopoly Law was being "shelved" by the central
government because of fears that it would impede the 3growth
of SOEs, which
4
are seen as the "key engines of economic development."
China's accession to the World Trade Organization ("WTO") on
November 11, 2002 raised Chinese concerns that job losses would result from
the "inevitable demise of unproductive state-owned industries," but the
accession also fostered a belief, within and outside China, that such disruptions
would be ameliorated by the benefits of market liberalization and free
competition.3 5 Furthermore, China's accession to the WTO did spark concerns
among foreigners who felt that China would face serious difficulties in
complying with the WTO's requirements of transparency and nondiscrimination.3 6 In response, the NPC Standing Committee stated that China

31
32

Xiaoye, 3 Wash U Global Studies L Rev at 285 (cited in note 30).
See China-Antitrust Law to Curb Cartel Collusion, China Daily (Oct 5, 1998) (reporting that
Professor Sheng Jiemen of Beijing University was "concerned about spreading abuse of market
power via... cartel actions [in five industrial sectors that had engaged in cartel actions to fix
prices, with other sectors expected to follow suit]"); Chang Weimin, China:Antitrust Rules Planned,
China Daily 5 (Aug 9, 1999), quoting Professor Wu Hanhong of Renmin University as saying that
he believed the "government ha[d] decided to step in because cartels, backed by industrial
associations, have already failed to solv[e] pricing problems."

33

China's Price Law Embodies Features of Modern Market Economy, China Bus Info Net (Apr 30, 1998)
(quoting Wei Dale of the State Development Planning Commission).

34

Action Uged on AntitrustLaw, China Daily (Sept 1, 1998).

35

Monitor InternationalComment as Peking Reaches Agreement with Washington on China's Entry into the
World Trade Organisation,The Independent (London) Features 2 (Nov 17, 1999). See generally Jan
Hoogmartens, Can China's SocialistMarket Survive WTO Accession? Poltics, Market Economy and Rule of
Law, 7 NAFTA L & Bus Rev Am 37 (2001).
Lindsay Wilson, Note, Investors Beware: The WTO Will Not Cure All Ills with China, 2003 Colum Bus
L Rev 1007, 1020 ("Ambiguity, conflicts and uneven enforcement of legislation all create pitfalls
for foreign investors that are not addressed by China's accession to the World Trade
Organization." Furthermore, "[l]egislation governing antitrust and anti-subsidy issues does not
exist.'). See also Stanley B. Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China after Mao 315 (Stanford
1999) ("The operation of Chinese legal institutions... calls into question China's ability to meet
the GATT requirement of transparency.").

36
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3
would draft an antitrust law as part of its preparation for entry into the WTO. 1
Government officials highlighted the need to address China's administrative
monopolies and private restraints. 38 However, since China's accession, internal
support for liberalization and legal reform have been tempered by the prospect
of consequential bankruptcies, job losses, and social unrest.3 9 Nevertheless, the
persistent pressure from other WTO members has impelled the Chinese
government to take deliberate action toward enacting legislation, including
antitrust legislation, that is seen as necessary to satisfy WTO norms.4 ° Other
factors, such as a massive influx of foreign investment; the concomitant
internationalization of Chinese markets; and the rapidly growing participation of
Chinese entities, both state-owned and private, in the market have combined to
increase support of, and a broad recognition of the need for, a comprehensive,
strongly enforced competition law.
In 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
("MOFTEC'D, a predecessor of MOFCOM, promulgated draft rules on the
notice and approval process for concentrations involving foreign
multinationals.4' These rules were built upon, and to some extent based on,
preexisting restrictions on foreign investment, and were criticized for the
implication that they would be applied solely to foreign companies.42 In March
2003, the Provisional Merger & Acquisitions Rules were promulgated by
MOFCOM and SAIC. In June 2003, the NDRC promulgated the Provisional
Rules on the Prohibition of Monopolistic Pricing Behaviors ("Provisional
Rules"). The Provisional Rules, which included antitrust provisions purportedly

37
38

Beiing Amends Laws to Preparefor WITO Enty, Xinhua News Agency, pt 3 (Mar 7, 2001).
China: Break Down Monopo#y for a Fairer Market, China Daily 4 (une 28, 2001) (quoting Wang

41

Qishan, Minister of State Council Office for Economic Restructuring, as stating that "if any
sectors or conglomerates operate in a manner which is against competition, they must
restructure'); Mitch Dudek and Alex Wang, China's Accession to the WTO: Ready and Willing... But
Able?, China L & Prac 18 (Dec 1, 2001).
See Zhu Jianrong, China--O Years after W'TO Enty: Hardships and Dreams to Become a Major
Economic PowerGo Handin Hand, 21 JJap Trade & Indust 30 (an/Feb 2002).
Text ofLi Peng's Work Report to China's NationalPeople's Congress, BBC Monitoring Intl Rep (Mar 19,
2002); China to Set Up Unified, Fair National Market, AsiaInfo Daily China News (Mar 26, 2002)
(outlining remarks of Wang Yang, Vice Minister of the State Development Planning Commission
("SDPC") at the 2002 China Development Forum in Beijing to the effect that new laws, including
an antitrust law, consistent with the development of a market economy, would be enacted, while
laws in conflict with a market economy would be cancelled or modified); Expert: China Making
Rapid Headway on WITO Requirements, Bus Daily Update 19 (an 19, 2004) (summarizing remarks by
former MOFTEC Vice Minister Tong Zhiguang to the effect that China had repealed 2,300 laws
and regulations deemed incompatible with WTO requirements since accession and had
implemented or was drafting laws, including an antitrust law, to facilitate the opening of markets).
New Anti-Trust Rules, Economist Intelligence Unit (Oct 24, 2002).

42

Id.

39
40
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banning price-fixing, monopolistic conduct, and predatory pricing, 4 were
heralded by some as a serious move toward the enactment of a comprehensive
antitrust law. Others, however, saw the Provisional Rules as an indication that
the drafting of such a law was bogged down, resulting in a few elements of the
draft law being issued in the form of the Provisional Rules. 44 Enforcement of the
Provisional Rules was ultimately abandoned.45
In 2003, the State Council Legislative Affairs Office ("LAO") undertook
review of an October 2002 draft Anti-Monopoly Law4 6 ("October 2002 Draft
AML") prepared by the former SETC. The October 2002 Draft AML
proscribed collusion among businesses, abuse of market dominance, and
excessive concentration.47 It also included provisions prohibiting abuses of
administrative power by governmental units through so-called administrative
monopolies. Chapter Six of that draft law provided for the creation of an AntiMonopoly Management Body of the State Council, which would be charged
with investigation, prosecution, issuance of policies and rules, and resolution of
all matters requiring its approval under the law. A later draft allocated authority
for enforcement of the law among three agencies: MOFCOM (for merger
review and administrative monopolies), SAIC (for "monopoly agreements" and
abuses of dominant position), and the NDRC (for price collusion and bid
rigging). Foreigners expressed concern about possible foreign-focused
enforcement of provisions in these early AML drafts that were partially based on
certain foreign-only provisions in the Provisional Rules.48 LAO, MOFCOM, and
SAIC subsequently solicited the views of foreign governments and nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") regarding the revised September 2003
Draft AML.4 9 That draft law was also the topic of a two-day conference hosted
43

44
45

For a discussion of principal provisions of the Provisional Rules and their relationship to the
proposed Anti-Monopoly Law, see Yee Wah Chin, Antitrust Considerations in China Mergers (2003)
(on file with author).
Hu, China Unveils Competition Rules, South China Morning Post at I (cited in note 28).
See Shu-Ching Jean Chen, China Quietly Scraps M&A Review, Daily Deal (July 15, 2003) (quoting
MOFCOM official Zheng Zhao as saying that MOFCOM would "simply not enforce an antitrust
review when approving M&A transactions.").

46

See Joint Submission of the American Bar Assodation's Sections of Antitrust Law and InternationalLaw and
Practice on the Proposed Anti-Monopoy Law of the People's Republic of China, available online at
<http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/comments/2003/jointsubmission.pdf> (visited May 7, 2006)
(including detailed discussions and comments regarding the provisions of the October 2002 Draft
AML) (hereinafter ABA 2003 Comments).

47

An unofficial English translation of the October 2002 Draft AML is on file with the author.

48

Lester Ross, Monopoly Law Must Be Equal: Draft Competition Legislation in China Threatens to Be
Cumbersomefor Regulators, Fin Times 10 (Oct 1, 2003).
An unofficial English translation of this draft is on file with the author. Regarding the September
2003 Draft AML, see generally Competition Laws Outside the United States, in Antitrust Law 5 (ABA

49
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by MOFCOM outside Beijing in October 2003. Leading Chinese academics and
5°
a few practitioners from Japan, Germany, and the US attended the conference.
A February 2004 draft of the law ("February 2004 Draft AML") called for
a "competent Anti-Monopoly Authority under the Ministry of Commerce," a
concept that was retained in the July 2004 draft ("July 2004 Draft AML")
promulgated by MOFCOM in March 2004 (despite the July date borne by the
publicly released version) and listed on the legislative agenda of the Tenth
National People's Congress, whose session ends in 2008.51 Concern about law
enforcement centered on foreign firms was heightened in May 2004 with the
release of the "SAIC Report," a paper prepared by the Fair Trade Bureau of
SAIC that identified alleged abuses of dominant positions by certain foreign
firms, including Microsoft, Kodak, and TetraPakS2-accusations denied by the
named firms.5 3 SAIC's support of limiting the scope of enforcement of the new

50
51

52

53

1st Supp 2005); EU OfficialSays China Has Made 'ImportantSteps' Forwardon Competition Poliy, BBC
Monitoring Intl Rep (Nov 24, 2003) (reporting that European Union ("EU") Commissioner
Mario Monti was "impressed by the 'openness and willingness' shown by Chinese officials in
cooperation on competition policy" and citing the execution of a memorandum of understanding
between the EU and China for establishing a dialogue mechanism on competition policy).
The author was a participant in this conference.
Unofficial English translations of the February 2004 Draft AML and the July 2004 Draft AMIL are
on file with the author. For a more in-depth discussion of selected provisions of the February
2004 Draft AML, see H. Stephen Harris, Jr., An Overview of the Draft China Antimonopoy Law, 34
Ga J Intl & Comp L 131 (2005). For a discussion of the July 2004 Draft AML in the context of
Chinese economic structure and policy, see Bruce M. Owen, Su Sun, and Wentong Zheng,
Antitrust in China: The Problem of Incentive Compatibiliy, 1J Competition L & Econ 123 (2005).
Wang Xiaoye, Report: Ani-Monopoly Law Vital, China Daily 11 (Aug 20, 2004); Tang Zhengyu,
Towards an Anti-Monopoy Law; China Vows to Upgrade Its Competition Safeguards, China L & Prac 1
(July 1, 2004); Dai Yan, Monopoly Law Badly Needed, Report Says, China Daily 1 (May 25, 2004). A
copy of an unofficial English translation of the SAIC Report is on file with the author. The
concern about selective legal enforcement continues. See, for example, Chris Buckley, China to
Consider IntroducingAnti-Monopoly Law, Reuters (Dec 28, 2005) (predicting that "it may be foreign
multinationals-not China's state conglomerates-that are the initial targets of the law" and
quoting Nathan Bush as stating that "[a]lthough the draft Anti-Monopoly Law does not
distinguish foreign and domestic firms, its initial targets are likely to be foreign firms with
prominent positions in Chinese markets"); Antitrust Distrust,Economist Intelligence Unit aJan 16,
2006) ("Many foreign companies fear that they may become victims of China's first law against
monopolies.").
See, for example, Kodak Denies Monopolistic Accusations, Bus Daily Update 8 (June 8, 2004).
Professor Sheng Jiemen of Peking University Law School, Director of the Economic Law
Institute of Peking University and an advisor on the drafting of the Anti-Monopoly Law, states, in
a paper entitied How Does the Chinese Government Regulate Foreign Investors' M&A of Domestic
Enterprises? (on file with author), that the reports are "merely a legal analysis of the
monopolization trend and the unfair competition acts carried out by some multinational
corporations and some industries, aiming at arousing the attention of the Chinese government."
Professor Sheng goes on to write that "antitrust regulation should be nationality-ftee" and that
"unfair competition acts and abuses of the dominant position conducted by the Chinese
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law to private conduct, and thereby excepting government conduct, was also
reflected in a January 2004 submission by a SAIC official to the OECD Global
Competition Forum.5 4 Underscoring the continuing disagreement about which
agencies would have enforcement and policy-making powers under the law,
MOFCOM proceeded to set up its own Anti-Monopoly Office in September
2004. 5" Activity toward completing a draft of the AML intensified during the
latter part of 2004.56
MOFCOM's Anti-Monopoly Office submitted a "Submission Draft" of
the law, bearing the signature of MOFCOM Minister Bo Xilai, to the LAO in
February 2004. 5" The Submission Draft was apparently substantially similar to
the draft subsequently released on March 30, 2005 ("March 2005 Draft AML"),58
which deleted references to an enforcement authority under MOFCOM and
instead called for the creation of an "anti-monopolization authority under the
State Council." In April 2005, the State Council released a draft law ("April 2005
Draft AML") for comments. The April 2005 Draft AML provided for the
establishment of an "Anti-Monopoly Authority" under the State Council, and

54

55

56

57

58

enterprises should also be subject to legal regulation." He notes that the report "is only an analysis
of a social economic phenomenon, which does not mean that [it is] a 'killer of multinational
corporations,' nor does it show that China's Antitrust Law is targeted at multinational
corporations only." Id at 5.
Wang, Challenges/Obstacles Faced by Competition Authorities at 2 (cited in note 5) (asserting that
"[a]ntitrust law is supposed to be against private anticompetitive conduct and is not supposed to
be applied to markets that are controlled or regulated by the government").
Yan Yang, Ministry Sets up Anti-Monopoy Office, China Daily 9 (Sept 17, 2004). See also MOFCOM
Press Release (Sept 17, 2004), available online in Chinese at <http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/
aarticle/dzgg/f/200411/20041100306394.html> (visited May 7, 2006) (stating that "[t]he
Antimonopoly Office, a non standing organization at present, will perform its function through
the Department of Treaty and Law. The main function and duty of Anti-Monopoly Office
involves international exchange and cooperation on competition policy, legislation concerning
antimonopoly law, investigation of antimonopoly law violations. The goal of the antimonopoly
office is to promote the establishment of a unified, open, competitive and orderly national market
and to protect the consumer interests by prohibiting monopolistic behaviors and maintaining fair
competition.').
See Dai Yan, Making ofAnti-Trust Law is Speeded Up, Fin Times 28 (Oct 28, 2004), quoting Shang
Ming, Director-General of the Department of Treaty and Law of MOFCOM, as saying that
China would accelerate the drafting of the law "to guarantee a fair and orderly market" and that
"[a]dministrative monopolies are a problem that more attention should be paid to in the antitrust
law."
MOC Finishes Draft Antitrust Law, Comtex News Net (Nov 12, 2004), quoting Shang Ming,
Director-General of the Department of Treaty and Law of MOFCOM. Regarding the drafting
and sources of inspiration for the 2004 drafts of the AML, see generally Mark Williams,
Competition Poliy and Law in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan (Cambridge 2005).
An unofficial English translation of the March 2005 Draft AML is on file with the author.
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the Authority was granted broad powers to implement and enforce the law.
This draft AML was the subject of the International Seminar on Anti-Monopoly
Legislation, which was held in Beijing in May 2005 and hosted by the LAO.6"
Participants included leading academics and officials from antitrust agencies in
the US, the European Community ("EC'), Germany, Japan, Korea, and Russia
as well as representatives of the ABA, the International Bar Association, and
NGOs like UNCTAD and the OECD.6 1 Conference participants discussed the
allocation of certain policy-making, implementation, and enforcement powers
among the three host agencies, which would be overseen and directed by the
State Council. Conference attendees also offered substantive critiques of the
draft and suggested proposals for changes to the draft to bring it into closer
conformity with international norms.62
A revision dated July 27, 2005, which was regarded by some Chinese
officials as an unofficial version of the draft AML, subsequently came to light

59

60

61

62

For a general overview of principal provisions of this draft, see H. Stephen Harris, Jr. and Kathy
Lijun Yang, China:Latest Developments in Anti-Monopoly Legislation, 19 Antitrust 89 (2005).
A copy of the official English translation of the April 8, 2005 Draft AML is on file with the
author. The author was a participant in this seminar. See also Joint Submission of the American Bar
Association 'sSections ofAntitrust Law, IntellectualPropertyLaw and InternationalLaw on the ProposedAniMonopoly Law ofthe People's Republic ofChina, available online at <http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/
comments/2005/05-05/commentsprc2005wapp.pdf> (visited May 7, 2006) (hereinafter ABA
2005 Comments); Wang Xiaoye, Comments on Latest Draft of ChineseAntitrust Law, Speech at the Intl
Seminar on Anti-Monopoly Legislation (May 2005) (on file with author); Proposed Revisions to
Selected Articles of the April 8, 2005 Revised Draft of the Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of
China,in Supplementation of the Joint Submission of the American BarAssociation'sSections ofAntitrust Law,
IntellectualPropery Law and InternationalLaw, On the ProposedLaw (May 19, 2005), submitted to Mr.
Wu Zhenguo of MOFCOM (hereinafter ABA 2005 Revisions). A detailed discussion of the
provisions in the April 2005 Draft AML, as well as the ABA comments and suggested revisions, is
available online at <http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/comments/2005/reports.html> (visited
May 7, 2006).
China has thereafter fostered its outreach efforts by establishing cooperative links with foreign
antitrust authorities. See Russia, China Sign CooperationAccords, BBC Worldwide Monitoring (Nov
3, 2005) (reporting that China signed a "memorandum on mutual understanding on implementing
the intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in preventing unfair competition and
implementing antimonopoly policy for 2006 and 2007" in November 2005).
See, for example, remarks given by participants at the International Seminar on Anti-Monopoly
Legislation (May 23-24, 2005): Wang Xiaoye, Comments on Latest Draft ofChinese AntitrustLaw (May
24, 2005); William Blumenthal, Presentationto State Council LegislativeAffairs Office Regarding the AntiMonopoly Law of the People's Republic of China (May 24, 2005). See also presentations submitted in
writing on behalf of the US Department ofJustice ("DOJ") Antitrust Division entitled Presentation
Concerning Monopoly Agreements (Concerted Practices) (May 23-24, 2005); Presentation Concerning
Investigation Procedures and Remedies (May 23-24, 2005); Presentation Concerning the Abuse of Market
DominantPosition (May 23-24, 2005). Copies of these presentations are on file with the author.
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("July 2005 Draft AML").63 A conference of Chinese scholars, officials, and
counsels of multinational corporations was held in Beijing on July 30, 2005.
During that conference, representatives of multinational corporations
emphasized their concerns about the draft's compulsory access provision and its
clause prohibiting undefined "abuses" of IP rights. They also expressed general
concerns prompted by the American Bar Association.'
The July 27, 2005 Draft AML continued to provide for an Anti-Monopoly
Authority under the State Council, as do the three most recent draft AMLs
known as of this writing-the September 14, 2005 draft AML ("September 14,
2005 Draft AML"), the September 30, 2005 draft AML ("September 30, 2005
Draft AML"),65 and the November 2005 Draft AML. The most recent draft
AML has been submitted to the Standing Committee of the NPC, which will
consider enactment of the law, perhaps with revisions by that committee, during
2006.66 Chinese officials have continued to reassure foreign companies that the
new law will be applied in a manner consistent with the antitrust laws of other
major jurisdictions, 67 although only fair and non-discriminatory enforcement
in
68
practice is likely to assuage many fearful multinational corporations.
Open communication with the Chinese officials pursuing passage of the
law continued in November 2005 with an Industry Panel Discussion on China's
Draft Anti-Monopoly Law in New York, which was co-sponsored by the US
Council for International Business, the US-China Business Council, and the US
Chamber of Commerce. Meeting attendees included representatives from the
63

An unofficial English translation of the July 2005 Draft AML is on file with the author. For a
discussion of revisions in the July 2005 Draft AML that may reflect consideration of the ABA
2005 Comments, see John Yong Ren and Yang Ning, The Imminent Release of China's Anti-Monopoy
Law-What to Expect, China L & Prac 1 (Sept 1, 2005).

64

65

Id. The International Bar Association Antitrust Committee Working Group on the Development
of Competition Law in the People's Republic of China, of which the author is a contributing
member, submitted Comments on the DraftAnti-Monopoy Law of the People's Republic of China (PRC)
(Draft of 27 July 2005) (Aug 23, 2005), available online at <http://www.ibanet.org/images/
downloads/IBA%2OSubmission.pdf> (visited May 7, 2006).
Unofficial English translations of the September 14, 2005 Draft AML and the September 30,

66

2005 Draft AML are on file with the author.
China to ConsiderIntrodudngAnti-Monopoy Law, Reuters (Dec 28, 2005).

67

See, for example, Mure Dickie, Be#iing's Antitrust Law Moves Closer to Fruition, Fin Times Asia-

68

Pacific 5 (Jan 21, 2006) (stating that "[s]ome Beijing officials are keen to rein in international
companies, such as Microsoft, that they see as exploiting market monopolies in China," but
quoting Zhang Qiong, Vice-Minister of the LAO, as saying that "[f]oreign companies do not need
to worry about this" and that "[t]he basic content and principles for application of [China's] antimonopoly law will be consistent with those of other major countries").
See Justine Lau, Anx4e#y Builds over Monopoly Law: The Development of a Competition Regime:
MulinationalsandLanyers Are Troubled by the Vagueness of the Long-Awaited New Legislation, Fin Times
9 (Nov 16, 2005).
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NPC, MOFCOM, and the State Intellectual Property Office ("SIPO"). US
antitrust practitioners and in-house counsel also participated in the meeting.
III. THE PENDING DRAFT ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW:
BACKGROUND AND SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS
As of this writing, the most current draft available to the author is the
November 11, 2005 Draft AML,6 9 whose date represents the third anniversary of
China's accession to the WTO. The AML drafters have acted laudably in
requesting comments from foreign governments and NGOs, and have seriously
considered these suggestions in revising the draft AML. The AML drafters have
also participated in conferences with foreign governments and NGOs. However,
the drafting process has not been entirely transparent, and it is important to note
that further revisions are possible during the NPC Standing Committee's review
of the legislation, and, potentially, the NPC's own amendment procedures. This
Article will seek to highlight aspects of the Current Draft AML that have
generated the most comment and concern among officials, scholars,
commentators, and practitioners-Chinese and non-Chinese alike. Many of the
Current Draft AML's provisions are, at least if read literally, consistent with
international competition law norms. These require little comment beyond
noting that fact, except where serious concerns persist about the way in which
such provisions may be implemented in a non-normative or discriminatory
manner. Thus, this Article does not attempt to provide a thorough comparative
law exegesis of each provision in the Current Draft AML. Instead, it seeks to
provide comparisons that may facilitate understanding of the drafters' apparent
intent or may point to potential inconsistencies between the Current Draft AML
and the approaches of other major competition law regimes.7 0
A. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE LAW
Article 1 of the Current Draft AML provides: "This law is enacted for the
purposes of prohibiting monopolistic conduct, protecting and promoting the
market competition, safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of

69

70

Unless indicated otherwise, all subsequent citations to the Draft AML in this Article will refer to
the November 11, 2005 Draft AML.
For a general comparison of European and US antitrust law and policy in the context of building
antitrust law in China, see David J. Gerber, Chinese Anti-Monopoy Law: Constructing Competition Law
in China: The Potential Value of European and US Experience, 3 Wash U Global Studies L Rev 315
(2004). See also Ohseung Kwon, Chinese Ani-Monopoy Law: Applying the Korean Experience with
Antitrust Law to the Development of Competition Law in China, 3 Wash U Global Studies L Rev 347

(2004).
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consumers and public interests, and ensuring the healthy development of the
socialist market economy."
The October 2002 Draft AML prohibited "monopoly," apparently
condemning a status of having achieved dominance in a market, even if through
lawful competition. Comments at conferences, and in written submissions,
noted that this language could support attacks on monopolists on the basis of
their status rather than their conduct,7 1 despite recognition in other major
jurisdictions that "[t]he mere possession of monopoly power, and the
concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an
important element of the free-market system."72 The April 8, 2005 Draft AML
and all subsequent drafts have clearly prohibited "monopolistic conduct"73
rather than monopoly itself.
"Monopolistic Conduct" is defined in Article 3 of the Current Draft AML
as follows:
"Monopolistic conduct" is defined in this Law as the following activities
which eliminate or restrict competition or are likely to have the effects to
eliminate or restrict competition:
(i) actions among undertakings to come to agreements, decisions, or other
consensus that eliminate or restrict competition (hereinafter "Monopoly
Agreements");
(ii) abuse of dominant market positions by undertakings;
(iii) concentration of undertakings that are likely to have the effects of
eliminating or restricting competition.
Concern had also been expressed about the October 2002 Draft AMIL's
use of the phrase "fair competition." Commentators wondered whether the term

71

72

See, for example, ABA 2003 Comments at 7 (cited in note 46). The October 2002 Draft AiML did
list types of conduct under Article 3 defining "monopoly," but the inclusion of "excessive
concentration of enterprises" as one category of prohibited conduct left some doubt as to
whether a status-based attack on a dominant firm could be based on this definition (despite the
drafters' likely intent that this language was to refer to mergers and acquisitions subject to review
under Chapter 4 of that draft).
VeriZon Communications,Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Tyinko, 540 US 398, 407 (2004). See also Treaty
Establishing the European Community, art 82, 1997 OJ (C 340) 3 (Nov 10, 1997) (hereinafter EC
Treaty) (prohibiting abuse of a dominant position, not possession of a dominant position) (emphasis
added); Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay, The EC Law of Competition 3.115 (Oxford 1999) ("The
holding of a dominant position is not in itself objectionable under Article 82. It is the abuse of
that position which contravenes the provision.").

73

The breadth of the meaning of "monopolistic conduct" in recent drafts, including Article 3 of the
Current Draft AML, indicates that the term is somewhat of a misnomer. The draft AMLs have
used the phrase "monopolistic conduct" to describe not only conduct by firms with dominant
market shares (or which threaten to gain a dominant market share), but also various types of wellrecognized anticompetitive conduct of firms of any size, such as price-fixing agreements between
competitors.
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was intended to mean something short of "free competition ' '74 or whether it
referred to consumer protection concerns, which would correspond with the
meaning given to the phrase in the context of trademark law. During
conferences, Chinese officials from the State Council, MOFCOM, and SAIC
sought to allay apprehensions by giving assurances that there was no intent that
"fair competition" meant anything other than market competition. Indeed, in
the Current Draft AML, Article 1 provides for safeguarding "the order of
market competition" in lieu of fair competition.
Article 1 of the Current Draft AML retains the language and meaning of
the October 2002 Draft AML in describing the purpose of the law as
"safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of consumers and public
interests" and "ensuring the healthy development of the socialist market
economy." The amendments to the Chinese Constitution that incorporated the
concept of a "socialist market economy""5 did not offer a precise definition of
that term. However, it appears to embrace the idea of using market competition
to enhance the efficient allocation of resources while restricting, or at least
transitioning gradually towards, private ownership of property.7 6 Although
virtually every Chinese law includes this language, the interpretation and
enforcement of such laws is rarely grounded in this concept. Nevertheless, the
continued inclusion of the term in the Current Draft AML remains worrisome
to some because its meaning is unknown and so flexible as to present agencies
and courts with a tool for applying the law in ways inconsistent with competition
law norms. Several commentators viewed the October 2002 Draft AML as
providing a basis for unsuccessful competitors to attempt to seek shelter from
74

On this general distinction, see Allen R. Kamp, Legal Development, Between-the-Wars Sodal
Thought." Karl Lewelyn, Legal Rea'sm, and the Uniform Commerial Code in Context, 59 Albany L Rev
325, 368 n 220 (1995). See also Rudolph J. Peritz, The 'Rule of Reason" in Antitrust Law: Propery
Logic in Restraint of Competition, 40 Hastings L J 285, 293-94 (1989) (describing congressional
debates over the pending Sherman Act regarding the distinction between industrial liberty and
unrestrained competition as well as the view that "free and fair competition" was "seen as the
victim of both unrestricted competition and unrestricted combination"); Spencer Weber Waller,
Market Talk. Competition Poliy in America, 22 L & Soc Inquiry 435, 438-39 (1997) (noting that the
meanings of "free competition" and "fair competition" have not remained stable over time, and
that, at one time, fair competition included a "right to combine to avoid the excesses of
competition to the death'). See also N PacRailway v United States, 356 US 1, 4 (1958), where the
Court stated that the Sherman Act:
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces
will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the
highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time
providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic
political and social institutions. But even were that premise open to question,
the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.

75
76

See text accompanying note 13.
See generally Jung and Hao, 24 NwJ Ind L & Bus at 125 (cited in note 28).
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competition and stressed the need to avoid the use of competition law to protect
competitors, as opposed to the competitive process,"7 consumer welfare, and
efficiency.7Y However, the language referring to "the legal rights of business
operators" was deleted from Article 1 of the February 2004 Draft ANML and
remains absent from Article 1 of the Current Draft AML, fostering concerns
about anti-competitive uses of the law.
B. EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF THE LAW
Article 2 of the Current Draft AML provides that:
This Law is applicable to monopolistic conduct in economic activities
within the territory of the People's Republic of China.
This Law is applicable to monopolistic conduct outside the People's
Republic of China that have eliminative or restrictive effects on competition
in the domestic market of the People's Republic of China.
As for monopolistic conduct prohibited by this Law, this Law does not
apply where laws or administrative regulations of relevant industries or
sectors provide provisions; however, this Law applies when activities of
undertakings fall outside the provisions of the laws or administrative
regulations of relevant industries or sectors, eliminating or restricting
competition.
Attempts to define the proper limits of extraterritorial jurisdiction have
engendered limitless debate. 79 In the United States, the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act ("FTAIA") limits the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act
to conduct that has, in part, a "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable
effect" on US commerce.8" Both Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Establishing
the European Community ("EC Treaty") expressly require an effect upon trade
between member states before either is applicable.8 ' The European Court of
First Instance has also adopted language embracing the effects doctrine,
including a requirement of a foreseeable, immediate, and substantial effect in the

77

See 2003 ABA Comments at 2, 40-41 (noting that competition laws should follow US antitrust law
in focusing on protecting the competitive process and not individual market participants) (cited in
note 46). See also Brown Shoe Co, Inc v United States, 370 US 294, 320 (1962) (noting that the
antitrust laws were enacted for "the protection of competition, not competitors').

78

See Reiter v Sonotone Cop, 442 US 330, 343 (1979) (stating that the Sherman Act was designed as a
"consumer welfare prescription").

79

80

See generally Karl M. Meessen, ed, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction
in Theory and Practice (Kluwer 1996);
Edward D. Cavanagh, The FTAJA and Empagran:What Next?, 58 SMU L Rev 1419 (2005); Sal K.
Mehra, ExtratertitorialAntitrustEnforcement and the Myth of InternationalConsensus, 10 Duke J Comp &
Intl L 191 (1999).
15 USC § 6a (2000).

81

See Faull and Nikpay, TheECLaw of Competition

2.100-2.111 (cited in note 72).
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European Community.82 Several commentators familiar with China's draft
AMLs have emphasized the need for the inclusion of, at a minimum, a
substantiality requirement to ensure that Article 2 could not be used to support
extraterritorial application of the law in cases of insubstantial effects on the
Chinese domestic market.83 However, Article 2 of the Current Draft AML does
not require that the anticompetitive effect be direct, substantial, or foreseeable,
causing observers to worry about the law's possible application to extraterritorial
conduct with indirect, insubstantial, or unforeseeable effects in China.
The final paragraph of Article 2 of the Current Draft AML recognizes the
potential inapplicability of the law to regulated sectors of the economy, at least
to the extent that the challenged conduct falls within the scope of specific
sectoral laws and regulations. Together with Article 38, Article 2 seems to
provide the Anti-Monopoly Authority and sectoral regulatory bodies with a type
of concurrent jurisdiction. The Anti-Monopoly Authority will likely defer to the
sectoral agency unless that body fails to act. Until these provisions are
implemented, one cannot know if they will operate to create a de facto sectoral
exemption for at least some industries and economic sectors. However, these
recent revisions seem to adumbrate an enhancement of the power of sectoral
regulators and a diminution of the reach of the Anti-Monopoly Law within
certain sectors.
Chapter 5 of previous draft AMLs, which addressed administrative
monopolies, seemingly provided Chinese antitrust authorities with a means of
resisting demands to carve out regionally and locally-controlled SOEs from the
Anti-Monopoly Law's, and thus market economy's, purview. However, the July
2005 Draft AML deleted key provisions of that Chapter, although it retained
other aspects of Chapter 5 that prohibited the abuse of administrative powers
through discriminatory treatment, restriction of market access, and compelled
restrictions on competition. The Current Draft AML has entirely eliminated the
former Chapter 5, rekindling concerns that the AML will focus, at least initially,
on regulating foreign enterprises and protecting SOEs.84 The possibility of
enforcement efforts centered upon limiting the access of foreign companies to
the Chinese market, thereby further sheltering SOEs, seemed underscored by
82

Gencor Ltd v Commission, Case T-102/96, 1999 ECR 11-753,
90-92 (Mar 25, 1999). But an
"indirect" effect on trade between Member States of the EC may be sufficient. See Compagnie
Matiime Bege Transports SA v Commission, 1996 ECR 11-1201 (Oct 8, 1996).

83

See, for example, ABA 2005 Comments at 2 (suggesting that the "geographically expansive
enforcement permitted by the proposed law [referring to the April 8, 2005 Draft] is likely to
discourage foreign companies from trading with, or investing in, China" and proposing inclusion
of a substantiality standard for the required effect on competition in China) (cited in note 60).
See, for example, Adam Cohen, Experts Concerned over China's New Antitrust Law, Dow Jones Chin

84

Fin Wire (Jan 30, 2006).
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the comments of one Chinese official during the recent National People's
Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. 85 Some
Chinese officials have commented that a separate law dealing with administrative
monopolies may be enacted in the future, 86 although others doubt the feasibility
of such a development, particularly in light of the seemingly peremptory,
wholesale deletion of Chapter 5 from the most recent draft AML. In any event,
it appears that the ambitious goal of directly tackling anticompetitive SOE
conduct has been at least temporarily abandoned.
C. MARKET DEFINITION
Article 4 of the October 2002 Draft AML provided that "[a] 'specific
market' in this law means the territorial area affected during a limited time
period by the sales of particular products by business operators." The proper
definition of a relevant geographic market and a relevant product market are, of
course, central to modern competition law analysis.8" The October 2002 Draft
AML did not appear to embrace accepted concepts central to product market
definition, including substitutability and elasticity of demand. A similar
formulation persisted through the April 8, 2005 Draft AML, and this was one of
the subjects discussed at length during the International Seminar on AntiMonopoly Legislation. Commentators from various jurisdictions emphasized the
importance of adopting more rigorous definitions of a relevant geographic
market and a relevant product market, and they recommended definitions that
would be consistent with the economic analyses used by major competition law
jurisdictions.88 The Current Draft AML contains a much-improved provision in
Article 4: "A 'relevant market' in this Law refers to the scope or area within

85

See Aggressive Foreign M&A Concern Chinese Officials, China News (Mar 27, 2006), available online at
<http://www.chinanews.cn/news/2005/2006-03-27/20788.html> (visited May 7, 2006), quoting
CPPCC member and National Bureau of Statistics Director General Li Deshui as saying:

86
87

88

If China lets multinationals' malicious mergers and acquisitions go ahead
freely, proprietary brands and innovation ability of China's national industry
would disappear gradually and core parts, key technologies and high added
value of China's leading enterprises might be completely controlled by
multinationals. As a result, China can only act as a worker in the overall
structure of division of labor in the globe.
Professor ShengJiemen, Address at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the ABA (Aug 2005).
See generally Thomas E. Kauper, The Problem of Market Definition under EC Competition Law, 20
Fordham Ind L J 1682 (1997); George Hay, John C. Hilke, and Philip B. Nelson, Symposium on
Antitrust Law and the Internationalization of Markets: Geographic Market Definition in an International
Context, 64 Chi Kent L Rev 711 (1988); Robert G. Harris and Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust Market
Definiion:An IntegratedApproach, 72 Cal L Rev 1 (1984).
Copies of materials distributed during this seminar are on file with the author.
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which the undertakings compete against each other during a certain period of
time for relevant products and services."
This definition of relevant product market has deleted the September 30,
2005 Draft AML's language incorporating the concept of mutual substitutability
in product market definition. The Current Draft AML has also excised the
September 30, 2005 Draft AML sentence defining a relevant geographic market
as one in which "undertakings supply products and consumers buy products and
within which the conditions of competition are basically homogeneous." The
prior draft's use of the term "basically homogeneous" in the definition of
relevant geographic market apparently derived from the European
Commission's competition law.89 The term's absence from the Current Draft
AML may indicate that implementing regulations or guidelines will provide
additional guidance about market definition, perhaps tracking the analysis
contained in US agencies' Horizontal Merger Guidelines."°
D. PROHIBITION OF CONCERTED ACTION
The provision roughly analogous to Section 1 of the Sherman Act91 and
Article 82 of the EC Treaty9 2 is found in Chapter II of the Current Draft AML
("Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements"), which comprises Articles 8 through
11. Early draft AMLs, such as the October 2002 Draft AML, did not
differentiate between horizontal agreements,93 which are proscribed by all
modern competition laws, and vertical agreements,9 4 which, with the exception
of resale price maintenance, are generally accorded more lenient treatment in
light of economic thinking that such agreements are often procompetitive." This
was another subject of considerable discussion at the International Seminar on
Anti-Monopoly Legislation. Subsequent draft AMLs, including the Current
Draft AML, recognize this important distinction. Article 8 states, in relevant
part, that "[a]ny Monopoly Agreements among competing undertakings shall be
89

See United Brands v Commission, Case 27/76, 1978 ECR 207, 274 (Nov 8, 1977). See generally

91

Valentine Korah, An Introductoy Guide to EC Compelition Law and Practice § 4.3.1.2 (Hart 8th ed
2004).
US Department of Justice and US Federal Trade Commission, HorizontalMergerGuidelines (revised
Apr 8, 1997), available online at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm>
(visited May 7, 2006).
Sherman Act, 26 Stat 209 (1890), codified at 15 USC § 1-7 (2000 & Supp 2004).

92

EC Treaty, art 82 (cited in note 72).

93

Defined as agreements between competitors at the same level of production.

94

Defined as agreements between economic actors at different levels of a supply chain, such as an
agreement between a manufacturer and a wholesaler or a wholesaler and a retailer.

95

See generally Glen 0. Robinson, Explaining Vertical Agreements: The Colgate Puzzle and Antitrust
Method, 80 Va L Rev 577 (1994).

90
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prohibited." The provision goes on to provide a non-exhaustive list of
prohibited horizontal agreements, including: agreements that "fix, maintain or
change prices of products"; "limit the production volume or sales volume of
products"; "segment the sales markets or the raw materials purchasing markets";
"limit the purchase of new technology, new facilities or limit the development of
new products, new technology"; or "jointly boycott transactions."
Article 10 is a separate prohibition on rigging bids to eliminate or restrict
competition. Article 10 is not referenced in Article 11, which may provide
exemptions for certain agreements otherwise prohibited under Articles 8 and 9,
thus apparently rendering bid-rigging the only type of anticompetitive agreement
categorically excluded from qualifying for an exemption, unlike other forms of
"hard core" price-fixing agreements.
The vertical agreements provision, Article 9 of the Current Draft AML,
prohibits resale price maintenance and the imposition of "other trading
conditions that materially eliminate [or] restrict competition., 9 6 While this latter
clause appears rather open-ended, it is appropriately limited-and hence the risk
of its potential misuse diminished-by the express requirement for proof of a
material adverse effect on competition.
The overall structure of the Current Draft AML's provisions relating to
agreements appears to derive from the original structure of the EC's
competition laws,97 which prohibited broad categories of conduct while
providing for "voluntary notification" to a central competition law agency that
could grant exemptions from those proscriptions. This approach contrasts
starkly with US antitrust law, under which competitive activity, with the
exception of a few narrow "per se" offenses, is lawful unless it is shown to
unreasonably restrict competition in the specific relevant markets.98 The Current
Draft AML adheres to the EC's initial approach despite recent EC reforms.99
The requirements for an exemption from Article 8 or 9 are set forth in Article
11, which provides as follows:

97

See also Japan Fair Trade Commission, Designation of Unfair Trade Practices 5 13 (June 18, 1982)
(prohibiting "dealing with the other party on conditions which unjustly restrict any transaction
between the said party and his other transacting party or other business activities of the said
party").
EC Treaty, arts 81, 82 (cited in note 72).

98

This point was made in the ABA 2003 Comments at 3 (cited in note 46).

99

Regarding the abolition of such a notification system in the EC, and the devolution of
enforcement and exemption authority to include agencies and courts of EC member states
(effective May 1, 2004 by virtue of Council Regulation 1/2003, 2003 OJ (L 1) 1), see generally Van
Bael and Bellis, Competition Law of the European Community 1-2 (Aspen 4th ed 2005). See also ABA
2003 Comments at 6 (cited in note 46) (noting that "the EC has found that individual exemptions
require a tremendous amount of governmental resources to process, while offering little benefit in
preventing anticompetitive conduct").
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The Monopoly Agreements among undertakings with the following
objectives shall be exempted from application of Article 8 [and] Article 9 of
this Law:
(i) to improve technology, research and develop new product;
(ii) to upgrade the product quality, reduce cost, enhance efficiency, and
unify the specifications and standards of product;
(iii) to improve operational efficiency and enhance competition capacity of
small and medium-sized undertakings;
(iv) to realize the social public interests such as to save energy, protect [the]
environment, and contribute for disaster [sic];

(v) to enhance the competitiveness of export products in the global market;
[and]
(vi) during the period of economic depression, to moderate serious
decreases in sales volumes or distinct production surpluses[.]
Undertakings shall prove the following conditions in order to apply the
provisions of the preceding paragraph:
(i) the Monopoly Agreements aim for the realization of the objective stated
in the preceding paragraph, and are necessary for the realization of the
objectives; 100
0
(ii) can enable consumers to share fairly the interests' ' derived from it; 102

[and]
(iii) will not substantially eliminate competition in the relevant market. 103
The subsections of Article 11 that address standard-setting and potential
innovative benefits from certain legitimate joint ventures are generally consistent

with US agencies' Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations among Competitors0

and

Article 81(3)(b) of the EC Treaty. The third subsection of Article 11 supports

100

This requirement seems to reflect the language in Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty disallowing
exemptions for concerted conduct that "impose[s] on [the parties undertaking the concerted
conduct] restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of [an improvement in the
production of goods or promotion of technical or economic progress]." EC Treaty, art 81(3)
(cited in note 72).
101 "Interests" may be a more appropriate translation than "benefits."
102

103

104

This language appears to derive from the provision in Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty that requires,
as one of the requisites for an individual exemption from Article 81, that the concerted conduct
"allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit." EC Treaty, art 81 (3) (cited in note 72).
This wording is apparently based on the language in Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty requiring that
a practice, in order to qualify for a possible exemption, not "afford [the parties to the concerted
action] the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in
question." EC Treaty, art 81(3) (cited in note 72).
United States Federal Trade Commission and United States Department of Justice, Antitrust
Guidelinesfor Collaborations among Compelitors (Apr 2000), available online at <http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf> (visited May 7, 2006).
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exemptions where joint conduct will assist the competitiveness of small- and
medium-sized entities. Although other jurisdictions acknowledge the importance
of small- and medium-sized enterprises to competition, they do not generally
allow size alone to constitute a basis for an exemption for conduct otherwise in
violation of the law or harmful to competition.1" 5 The unqualified language of
Article 11(iii) in the Current Draft AML poses a risk of protecting small
enterprises from competition solely by virtue of their size. Consumer welfare is
often best served by a few large competing enterprises because such companies
can, in many circumstances, operate more efficiently than their small
counterparts. As such, Article 11 (iii)'s basis for an exemption seems inconsistent
with international competition law norms. Perhaps the express inclusion of a
rule of reason weighing anticompetitive harm against procompetitive benefit, or
a safe harbor provision taking into account the maximum combined market
share of the small enterprises concerned, would alleviate this problem.
The fourth and sixth grounds for exemptions, Article 11 subparts (iv) and
(vi), contain language that is either unrelated to a consumer welfare rationale or
is too vague to provide useful guidance to any agency or court. "Sav[ing] energy"
should either be dealt with through the market mechanism, thereby ensuring
that the most efficient producer will, ceterisparibus,be the most efficient user of
energy and hence the winner in price competition, or by legislation distinct from
the Anti-Monopoly Law.1 °6 In addition, the Current Draft AML's provisions
addressing the economic effects of a "disaster," economic depressions, and
sharp decreases in sales or product surpluses should be expunged since such
grounds for an exemption would be insufficient under US antitrust law in the
Today, EC competition law is generally in
absence of special legislation.'
105

106

107

See EC Treaty, art 130 (cited in note 72) (expressing support for the creation of an environment
hospitable to small- and medium-sized business but noting that the EC Treaty "shall not
provide a basis for the introduction by the Community of any measure which could lead to a
distortion of competition"). While Section 1.1 of Canada's Competition Act, RSC 1985 c 19 (2d
Supp), provides that one of the Act's purposes is "to ensure that small and medium-sized
enterprises have an equitable opportunity to participate in the Canadian economy," the Canadian
Competition Tribunal has interpreted that provision not as a measure affording special protection
to small businesses, but as a recognition of the fact that such enterprises will have meaningful
opportunities to compete as a consequence of the competition fostered generally by enforcement
of the Act. Commissioner of Competition v Superior Propane Inc, 2000 Comp Trib 15 409 (Aug 30,
2000).
See ABA 2003 Comments at 9 (cited in note 46) (asserting that because such considerations are not
generally regarded as appropriate purposes of competition law and "do not lend themselves to
economic analysis," they are best dealt with through separate legislation).
Though the notion of crisis cartels (or any exemption for cartel activity) is antithetical to modem
US antitrust law, this was not the case during the 1930s. See Diane P. Wood, 2003 Milton Handler
Antitrust Review: The U.S. Antitrust Laws in a Global Context, 2004 Colum Bus L Rev 265, 267 (2004)
("Even the United States... flirted with this idea [of justifying cartels in response to an economic
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accord with US law involving most instances of overcapacity. Before its recent
abolition of the individual notification system, the EC had granted exemptions
to a few "crisis cartels" that had demonstrated structural overcapacity or other
sector-wide distortions over a sustained period of time.'1 8 Some commentators
have regarded this approach as an aspect of industrial-not competitionpolicy." 9 The express inclusion of such concepts in the exemption provisions of
the Anti-Monopoly Law (particularly the references to a "serious decrease in
sales volumes" or a "distinct product surplus") risks the widespread justification
of exemptions not because of a serious nationwide, or at least industry-wide,
economic crisis, but because of fluctuations in production and sales that are
commonplace in, and indeed part and parcel of, aggressive competition.
Article 12 of the September 30, 2005 Draft AML ("Voluntary
Notification") set forth procedures for seeking an exemption. Under this draft
law, the requesting entity would have needed to submit a notification to the
Anti-Monopoly Authority,"0 which would then have been required to decide,
within thirty days, whether to grant an exemption. If the Anti-Monopoly
Authority had failed to render a decision within thirty days, the agreement in
question would have remained in effect. This previous draft required any
decision prohibiting an agreement to be made in writing, and it gave the AntiMonopoly Authority the power to place additional restrictions on the
implementation of the exempted agreement. Publication of a decision approving
an agreement, with or without additional restrictions, was required to have been
made "in time." The Anti-Monopoly Authority was empowered to withdraw an
approval on the grounds enumerated in Article 13 of the September 30, 2005
Draft AML, including where: (i) the economic situation has substantially
changed; (ii) the original reasons for approval no longer exist; (iii) the
undertakings breach the additional conditions imposed upon; or (iv) the original
approval was made based on false information provided by the undertakings.
The Current Draft AML has deleted all references to standards or
procedures for seeking, granting, or withdrawing an exemption. It is unclear
whether such procedures will be provided in subsequent regulations or whether
the exemptions described in Article 11 of the Current Draft AML will be "selfexecuting"-in other words, presumed valid unless and until challenged by the

108

crisis] during the Great Depression of the 1930s, and the Supreme Court took a surprisingly
lenient view of the arrangement before it in AppalachianCoal").
See Van Bael and Bellis, Competition Law of the EuropeanCommuniy at 451-53 (cited in note 99).

109

See Andr6 Fiebig, Crisis Cartels and the Triumph of Industrial Pofiy over Competition Law in Europe, 25

110

Brooklyn J Intl L 607 (1999).
This agency is the central competition law enforcement body created by the AML (under Article
5), and it reports to the State Council. Its procedures and powers are set forth in Chapter 6 and
are discussed in detail below in Section II.H.
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Authority. To the extent that the Authority may, under the most recent draft
AML, consider the factors listed in Article 13 of the September 30, 2005 Draft
AML, such factors are worth commenting on.
The second basis for withdrawing approval under the September 30, 2005
Draft AML generally paralleled EC competition law, under which an exemption
applies to an agreement only if the four conditions of EC Treaty Article 81(3)
continue to be fulfilled. These conditions are as follows: first, the agreement
must contribute to an improvement in the production or distribution of goods
or must promote technical or economic progress; second, it must be
implemented in a manner that allows consumers a "fair share" of its benefits;
third, the agreement cannot impose restrictions that are not necessary to achieve
the aforementioned two objectives; and fourth, the agreement cannot contain
provisions that may eliminate competition with regard to a substantial part of
the products in the relevant market.'
The third and fourth grounds for withdrawing approval under the
September 30, 2005 Draft AML were based on the wrongdoing of the entities
seeking the exemption, and these grounds thus appeared to be fair and necessary
to ensure that the notification process would be used in good faith. The conduct
proscribed by the relevant provisions would have constituted grounds for a US
agency to seek relief (or sanctions) under a consent decree.
However, the September 30, 2005 Draft AML's first rationale for
withdrawal of an exemption is troubling. To the extent it means that the facts
underlying the grant no longer obtain, it seems superfluous, given that this is the
precise basis of the second ground. The provision must therefore envision the
withdrawal of an approval for changes in circumstances other than those on
which the exemption was based. Economic "situations" are, of course,
constantly in flux. Absent greater guidance regarding the types of substantial
changes sufficient to nullify an exemption, competitors may be hesitant to seek
(or rely upon) an exemption. Such uncertainty about the value and duration of
an exemption may undermine the intended liberalizing effects of the notification
system, assuming that the system will survive (as a future regulation or in some
other form) in the final AML.
E. ABUSE OF DOMINANCE
Chapter III ("Prohibitions of Abuse of Dominant Market Position")
comprises Articles 12 through 15 of the Current Draft AML and generally tracks
the EC competition law formulations for the assessment of unilateral firm
conduct and collective dominance. Article 12 prohibits dominant entities from
111 Van Bael and Bellis, Competition Law of the EuropeanCommuniy at 84-87 (cited in note 99).
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abusing their market position "to eliminate or restrict competition"'1 2 and
defines a "Dominant Market Position" as referring to "a controlling market
position held by one undertaking or several undertakings as a whole which is
capable of controlling the price or quantity of products or other trading
conditions in the relevant market or restricting or affecting other undertakings in
entering into the relevant market." This formulation appears to roughly parallel
concepts in the US antitrust law definition of market power, which is described
as "the ability to raise prices above those that would be charged in a competitive
market" ' or "the ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict output, for
reduced output is the almost inevitable result of higher prices."' 1 4 The European
Court of Justice ("ECJ") has defined a dominant position under the Article 82 of
the EC Treaty as "....

a position of economic

strength enjoyed by an

undertaking which enables it to hinder the maintenance of effective competition
of the relevant market by allowing it to behave to an appreciable extent
independently of its competitors and customers and ultimately of consumers.""'
The Current Draft AML deleted the September 30, 2005 Draft AML's
language defining a "dominant market position" as, in part, a market position
having the effect of eliminating or restricting competition."' The Current Draft
AML replaced this language with a requirement that the position restrict or
affect "other undertakings in entering into the relevant market." Under both
Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Article 82 of the EC Treaty, many instances
of monopolization, attempted monopolization, and abuses of dominance do not
involve prevention of entry. Instead, such situations often involve activities that
may threaten to (or in fact do) drive an existing competitor from the market.
Article 15 of the Current Draft AML lists specific abuses of a dominant position
and proscribes conduct that would appear, in context, to constitute more than
an abusive entry barrier. Presumably, then, the revised language in Article 12 of
the Current Draft AML is not intended to exclude exploitative and
discriminatory conduct or exclusionary conduct practiced against existing

112

113
114
115

116

Article 14 of the October 2002 Draft AML provided that "[a] business operator shall not abuse its
dominant marketing position, obstruct the activities of other business operators, eliminate or limit
competition." While this draft did not make the elimination or limitation of competition a
requisite element of abuse or "obstruction," the April 8, 2005 Draft AMIL rectified the
overbreadth problem.
Nat! CollegiateAthleic Assn v Board of Regents of the Univ of Oklahoma, 468 US 85, 109 n 38 (1984),
citingJeersonParishHospitalDistNo2 v Hde, 466 US 2, 27 n 46 (1984).
FortnerEnters,Inc v US Steel Corp, 394 US 495, 503 (1969).
Michelin v Commission, Case 322/81, 1983 ECR 3641, 3503 (Nov 9, 1983). See also United Brands v
Commission, Case 27/76, 1978 ECR 207, 277 (Feb 14, 1978); Hoffman-La Roche v Commission, Case
85/76, 1979 ECR 461, 520 (Feb 13, 1979).
September 30, 2005 Draft AML, art 14.
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competitors in the market from Chapter Ill's scope, assuming that such conduct
otherwise fulfilled the requirements contained in that Article.
Article 13 of the Current Draft AML sets forth the following factors to be
used in determining dominant market position:
(i) market share of the undertaking and the other undertakings which
have a competitive relationship with the undertaking in the relevant
market;
(ii) ability of the undertaking to control purchase market or sales market;
117
(iii) [omitted]
(iv) financial status and technical conditions of the undertaking;
(v) association condition of the undertaking with other undertakings;
(vi) the difficulty of entering the relevant market by other undertakings;
(vii) the dependent relationship on the undertaking of other undertakings
and the extent of it; [and]
(viii) other factors affecting market competition.
All of these factors may bear on the ability to raise prices or restrict output.
Under US law, market share is often the "traditional starting point ' 18 for
assessing the existence of market power, and low market shares "virtually
preclude a finding of market power, whereas a high market share indicates the
possibility that market power exists."11 9 However, a high market share alone is
not proof of market power. An economic analysis of other competitive factors
may demonstrate the absence of market power despite a high market share. 2 ° In
short, US antitrust law does not establish presumptions of market power based
solely on market share.
EC law recognizes that "the existence of a dominant position may derive
from several factors which, taken separately, are not necessarly determinative but
among these factors a highly important one is the existence of very large market
share."'' EC competition law relies more upon market share than its US
counterpart, as evidenced by the ECJ's pronouncement that high shares
necessarily provide "that freedom of action which is the special feature of a

17

The original Chinese version and English translation of the Current Draft AML omit subsection
(iii) of this Article.

118 ABA Section of Antitrust Law, I Antitrust Law Developments 68 (ABA 5th ed 2002).

19

120

121

Id (footnotes omitted). Indeed, proof of a "dominant market share" has been held to be a
requirement for the establishment of market power. See Fle,gel v Christian Hosp, 4 F3d 682, 689 (8th
Cir 1993).
See, for example, BallMemorialHospitalv Mutual HospitalInsurance, Inc, 784 F2d 1325, 1336 (7th Cir
1986). See generally ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Market Power Handbook: Competition Law and
Economic Foundations (ABA 2005).
Hoffman-La Roche, 1979 ECR at 520 (emphasis added).
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dominant position."' 22 As a consequence, EC courts and the European
Commission have found dominant positions based solely on high market
shares. 23 However, this rather peremptory finding is generally regarded as being
an appropriate substitute for further economic analysis only in the "most
obvious of cases.'

24

The Current Draft AML expressly presumes dominance based on market
shares, taking into account not only the share of the entity accused of the abuse,
but the sum of its shares and those of the other market leaders. Article 14
("Direct Determination 12 of Dominant Market Position") provides as follows:
Undertakings that have any of the following conditions, are directly

considered to be holding a dominant market position:
(i) the market share of one undertaking in [a] relevant market accounts for

1/2;
(ii) the joint market share of two undertakings as a whole in [a] relevant

market accounts for more than 2/3;
(iii) the joint market share of three undertakings as a whole in [a]relevant

market accounts for more than 3/4.
The undertakings which have the conditions stipulated in the preceding
Paragraph 2 [(ii)] [or] Paragraph 3 [(iii)] are not subject to the preceding
provisions if they can prove that there is material competition between
them.

122

Idat521.

123

Id at 526-29 (market shares in excess of 75 percent held to be "so large that they are in

124

themselves evidence of a dominant position" and shares over 84 percent are "so large that they
prove the existence of a dominant position"); AKZO Chemie BV v Commission, Case C-62/86, 1991
ECR 1-3359, 3453 (July 3, 1991); Commission Decision 92/163, 1992 OJ (L72) 1, 20-21.
Christopher Bellamy and Graham Child, European Communiy Law of Competilion § 9-046 at 707
(Sweet & Maxwell 5th ed 2001):

125

Except in the most obvious of cases .. . where one of the suppliers had a
massive share of a commodity product, the proof of a significant market share
is seldom a substitute for a full economic analysis of the issue of dominance.
First, even if the market share figures are reliable, maintenance of a significant
market share provides little information about the competitive process without
an understanding of the reasons for, and the pressures determining, the output
and price decisions made by the firms in the market. Secondly, even if the
market has been defined correctly, market share figures do not show relative
efficiencies and do not necessarily show that similar market shares can be
sustained in the future. Thirdly, the decisions that any firm makes may be
influenced by potential competitors who have not yet entered the market but
who would do so if a profitable opportunity were to arise. By their nature,
market share figures cannot measure this potential competition, even though
the threat that it presents may be a powerful influence restraining the
independence of an allegedly dominant firm. Fourthly, market power on the
part of the customers of the undertaking may limit its ability to act
independently of their wishes.
"Presumption" may be a more accurate translation than "Determination."
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The first subpart establishes a presumption of dominance based on the
single firm's ownership of a 50 percent market share. This figure is strikingly
lower than comparable presumptions seen in EC law. Furthermore, unlike EC
law, Article 14 of the Current Draft AML seems to preclude consideration of
other factors that may explain why a firm legitimately has a substantial market
share-including some of the factors referred to in Article 13 of the Current
Draft AML. The Current Draft AML provides no guidance about whether the
Article 13 factors may or may not be used to rebut a presumption under Article
14. One troubling reading would permit firms to avail themselves of the
consideration of such factors only when the firms were found "to be in a
dominant position" by virtue of one of the "direct determinations" in Article
14.126 If this description captures the intended interplay between these two
provisions, and if the factors in Article 13 cannot be used to rebut a
presumption of dominance under Article 14, the AML would be inconsistent
with most modern competition law regimes. Furthermore, such an interpretation
would appear to render Article 13 a nullity in instances of single, or joint,
holdings of sizable market share. The relationship between these provisions
should be clarified, either in the text of the AML or in subsequent regulations.
The second and third subparts of Article 14 are even more clearly
incompatible with international norms. Under the Current Draft AML, a
competitor with a third-largest market share of 5 percent may be deemed
dominant by virtue of the fact that the first- and second-largest competitors hold
a combined share in excess of 70 percent. A safe harbor in Article 15 of the
April 8, 2005 Draft AML127 had stipulated that undertakings with less than a 10
percent share would not be deemed to have a dominant market position, even if
they otherwise fell within the ambit of Article 14(iii). However, the language of
this Article does not appear in the Current Draft AML.
Finally, Article 14 of the Current Draft AML appears to embrace the
concept of "collective dominance" found in EC law. Article 82 of the EC Treaty
expressly prohibits "one or more undertakings" from abusing a dominant
position 128 and the ECJ has found that such collective dominance may be abused
even under circumstances in which the entities are "legally independent of each
126

The only clear exceptions are for those firms deemed to be dominant by virtue of Article 14(ii) or

127

14(iii). Such firms must demonstrate "material competition between them" under the last
sentence of Article 14. This savings clause did not appear in the September 30, 2005 Draft AML
and may have been added to respond to the concern that a firm with a fairly small market share
might be deemed dominant if its share was combined with the total market shares of its one or
two larger competitors.
April 8, 2005 Draft AML, art 15.

128

Collective dominance is also recognized in On the Control of Concentrationsbetween Undertakings ("EC
Merger Regulation'), Council Regulation 139/2004, OJ 2004 (L24) 1.
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other,... [where they] act together on a particular market as a collective
entity. '129 In conceptual terms, such an arrangement would apparently qualify as
concerted action in violation of Article 81 of the EC Treaty, not Article 82, and
under US law, acting jointly to monopolize a market may violate Sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act. However, under the Sherman Act, "conscious
parallelism" absent an agreement does not constitute a conspiracy necessary to
prove a violation of Section 1 or a conspiracy to monopolize under Section 2.130
In contrast, concerted action between entities is not required for a collective
dominant position to exist under EC law. Such a position may result solely from
the unilateral conduct of the parties, and it may be expected as a natural
consequence of the oligopolistic structure of a market.'
In the US, EC, and other major jurisdictions, the possession of market
power, or dominance, does not in itself constitute an abuse.'3 2 As noted above,
early drafts of the Anti-Monopoly Law seemed to disagree with this
presumption, and these draft AMLs contained broad language "prohibiting
monopoly [sic]," as opposed to proscribing abusive conduct alone. Since the
April 8, 2005 Draft AML, Chinese commentators have clearly indicated that only
an abuse of market power would constitute a violation of the AML.'33 The
International Seminar on Anti-Monopoly Legislation underscored this idea, as
129

CompagnieMaritime Be/ge Trans.portsSA v Commission, Joint Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P, 2000

130

ECR 1-01365, 1-01458 (Mar 16, 2000).
See, for example, Theatre Enteprses v ParamountFilm Distribution Cop, 346 US 537, 541 (1954)

131

("Circumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have made heavy inroads into the
traditional judicial attitude toward conspiracy; but 'conscious parallelism' has not yet read
conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely.") (internal citations omitted). See also Wood, 2004
Colum Bus L Rev at 277 (cited in note 107) (discussing the US Federal Trade Commission's
efforts, in the 1970s, to pursue "shared monopoly" or "oligopoly theories" in various industries,
and the failure and subsequent abandonment of those efforts).
See, for example, Airtourspc v Commission, Case T-342/99, 2002 ECR 11-2585, 2613 (June 6,
2002):
[1]n view of the actual characteristics of the relevant market and of the
alteration in its structure that the transaction would entail, the latter would
make each member of the dominant oligopoly, as it becomes aware of
common interests, consider it possible, economically rational, and hence
preferable, to adopt on a lasting basis a common policy on the market with the
aim of selling at above competitive prices, without having to enter into an
agreement or resort to a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 81
EC.

132

See, for example, KMB Warehouse Distributions,Inc v Walker Mfg Co, 61 F3d 123, 129 (2d Cir 1995)
("[A] showing of market power, while necessary to show adverse effect indirectly, is not
sufficient.").

133

See ForeignInvestors Set to be Granted WiderAccess to Chinese Market,Asia Pulse (uly 5, 2005) (quoting
Sheng Jiemen, Dean of Peking University's Institute of Economic Law, as saying that "[i]t should
be made very clear that the law does not prohibit dominant market position itself but does
prohibit abuse of such a position.').

Summer 2006

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

evidenced in this excerpt from a paper presented by William Blumenthal,
General Counsel of the US Federal Trade Commission:
Two key principles of United States law on monopolization should be
highlighted for [China's] consideration in connection with [its] draft law.
The first and most important principle is that United States competition law
does not condemn the mere possession of monopoly power, but punishes
only misuse that results in a substantial injury to competition. In our view,
punishment of a firm that obtains a dominant or monopoly position by
reducing price or offering new or improves products or services is contrary
to the goal of promoting competition. A free market system envisions that
competitors will strive for a superior position through innovation, greater
efficiency, or other legitimate competitive behavior. Innovation, economic
growth, and vigorous competition would be stifled if the law were to punish
successful market participants who achieve a dominant or monopoly
position.
A second principle is that even firms with monopoly power are permitted to
compete aggressively on the merits, even if a collateral effect is the failure of
their competitors. Competition is a rigorous process, and it will inevitably
yield both winners and losers. If a firm is more efficient and can thereby
reduce costs and expand sales at the expense of its less-efficient
competitors, our competition laws are not infringed. There may be harm to
competitors, but no harm to competition. Competitive conduct frequently
looks like exclusionary conduct, because aggressive competition may harm
less efficient firms. We do not protect less efficient businesses from
legitimate, vigorous competition, even where a firm holds a dominant or
monopoly position. On the other hand, our competition laws prohibit a
firm with monopoly power from engaging [in] conduct that has no
legitimate business justification other than to control prices or exclude
competition, because this type of conduct injures competition. In other
words, a firm with monopoly power may not engage in conduct that would
34
be unprofitable except for its exclusionary effects.
However, the Current Draft AML's non-exhaustive list enumerating
examples of abuses of a dominant position contravenes accepted modern
competition law norms in many respects. Article 15 provides as follows:
Undertakings are prohibited from the abuse of their dominant market
position by committing the following acts:
(i) [Monopoly Price] selling products at unfair[ly] high or buying products at

unfair[ly] low prices;
(ii) [Predatory Price] without valid reasons, selling products at prices below
cost;
(iii) [Refusing Trade] without valid reasons, refusing to trade with trading
partners;
(iv) [Mandatory Trade, Exclusive Trade] compelling trading partners to
trade with undertakings, or without valid reasons, restricting trading
134 Blumenthal, Presentationto State CoundilLegislaive Affairs Office (cited in note 62).
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partners to only trade with the undertaking or the undertakings designated
by the undertaking;
(v) [Tying and Imposing Other Unreasonable Trading Conditions] contrary
to the will of the trading partners, tying products or imposing other
unreasonable trading conditions;
(vi) [Differentiated Treatment] without valid reasons, applying differentiated
treatment in regards to transaction conditions such as trading prices to
equivalent trading partners, so as to put some trading partners at a
competitive disadvantage; [and]
(vii) other abuses of [a] dominant market position.

Article 15(i) reflects a concept encapsulated in the competition laws of
several jurisdictions, although not the US. Many jurisdictions, including the EC,
have determined that it may constitute an exploitative abuse for a dominant
competitor to charge prices that are "unfairly" low or high. In United Brands, the
ECJ acknowledged that charging prices that have no "reasonable relationship to
the economic value of the product supplied is ... an abuse" while annulling the
European Commission's finding of such an abuse under the facts of that case.13
The Japan Anti-Monopoly Act ("AMA")' 36 includes within its definition of
'
"unfair trade practices" "[d]ealing at unjust prices."137
As elucidated by Sections
6 and 7 of the General Designations,'38 unjust low price sales and unjust high
price purchasing are defined as follows:
135

136

137
138

United Brands, 1978 ECR at 301. The Commission initially engaged in an analysis that included
three types of price comparisons. It examined whether differences existed: (1) among prices in
several EC member states; (2) between prices charged by United Brands for branded "Chiquita"
bananas and non-branded bananas; and (3) between prices of Chiquita-branded bananas and
competing banana products. The Commission found substantial differences: (1) prices were
considerably higher in certain members states than in Ireland (sometimes 100 percent higher); (2)
branded prices exceeded unbranded prices by 20 to 40 percent; and (3) prices of competing
brands were "generally lower" than those of the Chiquita brand. Id at 299-300 (citing
Commission Decision 76/353, 1976 OJ (L95) 1). On appeal, the ECJ annulled the finding of
excessive pricing, noting that the Commission's determination of a "very substantial profit"
ignored the fact that the lower prices in Ireland had actually resulted in losses, rendering the
inference of unfairness of higher prices elsewhere insupportable. Id at 303.
Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi Oyobi Kosei Torihiki no Kakuho ni Kansuru Horitsu [Act
Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade], Law No 54
of 1947 (Japan) (as amended), unofficial English translation available online at <http://
www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/amended-ama.pdf> (visited May 7, 2006) (hereinafter
AMA). On the origins of the AMA, see Harry First, Antitrust in Japan: The Onginal Intent, 9 Pac
Rim L & Poly J 1 (2000). For a general overview of the AMA and its enforcement, see James D.
Fry, Struggling to Teethe: Japan'sAntitrust Enforcement Regime, 32 L & Poly in Intl Bus 825 (2001).
AMA § 2(9)(ii). See also AMA § 19 ("No entrepreneur shall employ unfair trade practices.").
Pursuant to AMA § 2(9), the Japan Fair Trade Commission ("JFIC") promulgated the
Designation of Unfair Trade Practices, JFTC Notification No 15 of 1982 (1982) (Japan), English
translation available online at <http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/unfairtrade
practices.pdf> (visited May 7, 2006) (hereinafter General Designations).
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Section 6 (Unjust Low Price Sales)
Without a proper justification, supplying a commodity or service
continuously at a price which is excessively below cost incurred in the said
supply, or otherwise unjustly supplying a commodity or service at a low
price, thereby tending to cause difficulties to the business activities of other
entrepreneurs.
Section 7 (Unjust High Price Purchasing)
Unjustly purchasing a commodity or service at a high price, thereby tending
to cause difficulties to the business activities of other entrepreneurs. 139
As with the Current Draft AML, such provisions beg the question of what
is "excessive" or "unjust" and what kinds of "difficulties" for other
4°
entrepreneurs are sufficient to render a given firm's pricing decisions unlawful'
"Excessive" and "unjust" are highly subjective words and the enforcement of
laws incorporating these terms is likely to result in prices that protect inefficient
or otherwise unsuccessful competitors from the "difficulties" of free
competition, thereby frustrating the proper pro-efficiency and consumer welfare
goals of competition law. 4'
Current US antitrust laws and policies are averse to firms that attempt to
use courts or enforcement agencies to impose and police a "fair price."
Determining such a price is considered to be practically impossible, and the
concept of government-set prices belies the purpose of having competition laws.
As noted above, the US Supreme Court has recently reiterated that the charging
of monopoly prices is an important and useful element of the free market
system, particularly because such profits "induce[ risk taking that produces
innovation and economic growth.' 4, 2 Monopoly profits are seen as the reward
for using superior "business acumen" or creating a "superior product.' ' 143 They
are an important component of the incentive system that continuously causes
the free market to generate better products and services.
Such products and services may be costly in the short-run, but they may
otherwise be unavailable at any price, and in the long run, lower overall prices
will prevail. In essence, the "fair" price, under US law, is the price determined
139

Id at § 6-7.

140

See ABA 2005 Comments at 17-18 (cited in note 60).

141 Note that US antitrust law does recognize a "failing firm" defense that excludes unsuccessful

142
143

firms from some forms of antitrust scrutiny. See US HorizontalMegerGuidelines S 5.1 (cited in note
90). But the purpose of these laws is to prevent harm to innocent third parties-for instance, the
thousands of employees who would be laid off if a factory was forced to close-rather than to
protect the firm itself.
Veirkon, 540 US at 407.
United States v GrinnellCorp, 384 US 563, 570-71 (1966) (distinguishing the garnering of monopoly
prices through better products or better business practices from the "willful acquisition or
maintenance of [monopoly] power" that would violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act).

Vol. 7 No. 1

The Making of an Antitrust Law

Harris

through negotiations between independent buyers and sellers acting in their
respective self-interests in a free market. The EC, Japan, and other jurisdictions
with laws prohibiting "unfair" or "unjust" prices have rarely undertaken
enforcement actions based on such provisions. 1" One possible reason for this
sporadic legal enforcement is that no economic theory (other than use of a
market-based price) can determine what constitutes a "fair" or "just" price.
Furthermore, the duty to monitor and police any decision imposing a "fair"
price places an enormous burden on government entities that may need to adjust
the "fair" price to accommodate constantly changing market conditions.
Article 15(ii) of the Current Draft AML prohibits "selling products at
prices below cost." The September 30, 2005 Draft AML required that the
below-cost sales be undertaken "in order to eliminate competition."14 It is
important that such a purpose and effect be demonstrated in order for belowcost pricing to constitute a competitive concern. The US Supreme Court has
required a showing that the purpose of the pricing was to "eliminat[e]
competitors in the short run and reduc[e] competition in the long run."' 46
Because "cutting prices in order to increase business is the very essence of
competition," the Court has warned that adopting a rule authorizing "a search
for a particular type of undesirable pricing
behavior [may] end up by
147
discouraging legitimate price competition.'
Current US antitrust law only allows a claim of predatory pricing to be
sustained if two conditions are satisfied: an appropriate measure of cost is used
and the claimant can prove the alleged predator's ability to recoup its losses after
eliminating competition. Both these requirements stem from the bedrock
foundation of US antitrust law-consumer welfare. Although courts in the
United States have applied varying measures of cost, generally if a seller can sell
another unit of a line of products at a price above its reasonably anticipated
marginal cost (the cost of producing an additional unit), then the consumer is
obtaining the low-priced product as a consequence of the seller's efficient
production (and not any sacrifice of profit), and is thus benefiting from lawful
aggressive, profit-maximizing competition.'48 The requirement of proof that the

145

See Van Bael & Bellis, Competition Law § 8.7(2) at 914 (cited in note 99) (stating that Article 82
cases based on excessively low prices are "likely to be rare").
September 30, 2005 Draft AML, art 17(ii).

146

Caigill,Inc v Monfort of Colorado,Inc, 479 US 104, 117 (1986).

147

MatsushitaElectric Industrial Co v Zenith Radio Corp, 475 US 574, 594 (1986) (citation omitted).

148

The seminal article from which this price-cost analysis springs is Phillip Areeda and Donald F.
Turner, Predatoy Priingand Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,88 Harv L Rev 697
(1975). The "Areeda-Turner Test" deems as predatory those prices set below reasonably
anticipated marginal costs. Id at 712. As marginal costs often cannot be measured with any
accuracy, long-term average variable cost is often used as a surrogate. Id at 716. Many US courts

144
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predatory firm is likely to recoup its losses from below-cost sales after
eliminating competition reflects the US Supreme Court's recognition that, absent
recoupment, "predatory pricing produces lower aggregate prices in the market
and consumer welfare is enhanced ... [Uqnsuccessful predation is in general a
boon to consumers., 149 The Current Draft AML's absence of an appropriate
definition of "cost" and a requirement of proof of a likelihood of recoupment
poses the risk that the predatory pricing provision may be used to condemn
pricing behavior that benefits consumers.
Article 15(iii) prohibits refusals to deal "without valid reasons." This
provision is inconsistent with US antitrust law, particularly the Cogate doctrine, 5 °
under which firms have discretion in deciding with whom they will, or will not,
deal in the absence of proof that the refusal is part of an attempt to create or
maintain a monopoly. Although the European Commission and European
courts have imposed an obligation to deal more frequently than US courts, and
refusals to deal may constitute an abuse of a dominant position in violation of
EC Treaty Article 82 (unless "objectively justified"),' 5' firms competing in
Europe are, "as a rule, free to choose their business partners. '5 2
An unqualified compulsion to deal is inconsistent with the protection of
consumer welfare.5 3 Replacing the phrase "without valid reasons" with "absent
proof of a purpose to create or maintain a monopoly" would bring subpart (iii)
into line with international competition law norms. Alternatively, the NPC, or,
post-enactment, the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority, should
consider defining "valid reasons" in a manner generally consistent with the
have applied the Areeda-Turner Test or one of its variants. See, for example, Kelco Disposal, Inc v
Browning-FerisIndus, 845 F2d 404, 407 (2d Cir 1988).

152

Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Cotp, 509 US 209, 224 (1993). Predatory prices
could help consumers if, after a period of predation, a price increase merely resulted in new
entrants that kept prices low and prevented the predator from raising prices sufficiently to recoup
losses.
United States v Colgate & Co, 250 US 300, 307 (1919) ("In the absence of any purpose to create or
maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman A]ct does not restrict the long recognized right of a
[seller] ... to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.").
For a comparison of the more flexible (but less certain) EC approach and the more rigid (but
more predictable) US approach, see Eleanor M. Fox, A Tale of Two Jurisdictionsand an Orphan Case:
Antitrust, IntellectualProperty, and Refusals to Deal,28 Fordham Ind L J 952 (2005).
Van Bael & Bellis, Competition Law § 8.8(1) at 940 (cited in note 99).

153

As pointed out in the ABA 2005 Commentr

149

150

151

[o]bligating a dominant seller to sell to all willing resellers is unlikely to protect
consumers' legitimate interests, because, for example, a willing reseller may be
unqualified to provide facilities or services desired by consumers or necessary
to the efficient distribution of the products and may instead 'free ride' on
efforts by others.
Id at 19 (cited in note 60).
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European Commission's use of "objectively justified" grounds for refusals to
deal.
Notably, the much-criticized broad draft provision that had prohibited
refusals of access to a "network or other infrastructure" owned by a dominant
firm has been deleted from the Current Draft AML. As Article 22 of the April 8,
2005 Draft AML, it read as follows:
In the case that an undertaking is unable to compete with the undertakings
with dominant market position without the access to a network or other
infrastructures owned by those dominant undertakings in relevant market,
the undertakings in dominant position shall not refuse to grant access to the
network or other infrastructures to other undertakings at reasonable prices.
However, the undertaking in dominant position may be exempted if it can
establish that it is impossible or unreasonable to grant access to the network
or other infrastructures to other undertakings on account of technology,
security or other justifiable reasons.
Although some lower US courts have applied the essential facilities
doctrine, the US Supreme Court has rejected its broad application as a matter of
US antitrust law.'5 4 The ECJ has found violations based on refusals to deal
(including refusals to license intellectual property rights) in "exceptional
circumstances."'' 5 The provision in the April 8, 2005 Draft AML contained few
of the limitations and requirements of proof established for the "exceptional"
application of the essential facilities doctrine under EC law. It thus posed a
serious risk of establishing a general right of compelled access, including
mandated sharing of infrastructure and networks, that would have chilled
innovation and investment. The deletion of this provision from the Current
Draft AML is a welcome development.5 6

154

See Vefiton, 540 US at 408. Although, "[u]nder certain circumstances, a refusal to cooperate with
rivals can constitute anticompetitive conduct and violate [Section 2 of the Sherman Act]," the
Court has "been very cautious in recognizing... exceptions [to the Colgate doctrine], because of
the uncertain virtue of forced sharing and the difficulty of identifying and remedying
anticompetitive conduct by a single firm." But see also id at 411 ("Thus it is said that 'essential
facility claims should ...be denied where a state or federal agency has effective power to compel
sharing and to regulate its scope and terms,"' but saying nothing about the doctrine's vitality
otherwise.).

155
156

See IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co KG, Case C-418/01, 2004 OJ
(Cl18) 14. The author was counsel to NDC Health in this matter.
For a discussion of the criteria that numerous US Circuit Courts of Appeal have used to narrowly
circumscribe the essential facilities doctrine, the US Supreme Court's recent decision recognizing
risks to competition and innovation posed by any broad application of the doctrine, and the ECJ's
limitation of the doctrine's applicability to "exceptional circumstances," see ABA 2005 Comments
at 20-21 (cited in note 60). See also H. Stephen Harris, Jr., Conference-U.S.-China Trade:

Opportunities andChallenges:An Overview of the Draft China Animonopoy Law, 34 Ga J Intl & Comp L
131 (2005).
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Article 15(iv) of the Current Draft AML prohibits "mandatory trade" and
exclusive dealing "without justification." As with the other subparts of this
Article, clarification-through regulations or other measures-is necessary
regarding what constitutes "justification." Article 20 of the April 8, 2005 Draft
AML prohibited only exclusive selling, not exclusive buying, 157 but both types of
exclusive transactions are prohibited in the Current Draft AML.
Because of the exclusionary effect, which forecloses a buyer (or seller)
from dealing with a competing seller (or buyer) for the duration of an exclusive
dealing agreement, the US, EC, and Japan'58 have competition laws that
proscribe exclusive dealing under certain circumstances.' 5 9 In the US, such
agreements may be condemned as violative of Section 1 of the Sherman Act
(banning agreements that unreasonably restrain trade); 6 ° Section 2 of the
161
Sherman Act (prohibiting monopolization and attempts to monopolize); 162
Section 3 of the Clayton Act (only applicable to agreements involving goods);
and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 163 Under EC law, exclusive
dealing may be condemned as a violation of Article 81 (particularly as a
supplementary obligation having no connection with the subject of the contract
of sale under paragraph (1)(e)) 164 or Article 82.165 During discussions at statesponsored seminars on China's draft AML, exclusive dealing was discussed in
the context of an abuse of a dominant position. Such conduct could arguably
also be attacked under a provision that is part of Chapter II ("Prohibition of
157

See discussion in ABA 2003 Comments at 20 (cited in note 46).

158

General Designations at § 11 (cited in note 138) (prohibiting "[u]njustly dealing with the other

159

party on condition that the said parry shall not deal with a competitor, thereby tending to reduce
transaction opportunities for the said competitor").
See generally ABA, I Antitrst Law Developments at 214-225 (cited in note 118); AKZO, 1991 ECR

160

at 1-3463 (cited in note 123).
15 USC § 1 (2000).

161 15 USC § 2 (2000).
162

15 USC

§ 14 (2000).

163

15 USC

§ 45(a)(1)

164

See Council Regulation 1215/1999, 1999 OJ (L148) 1. See also European Commission,
Competition Poligy in Europe: The Competition Rules for Suppl and DistributionAgreements (European
Communities 2002), available online at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/pubications/
rules-en.pdf> (visited May 7, 2006) (hereinafter Vertical Guidelines). The Vertical Guidenes provide
a 30 percent market share safe harbor for vertical agreements among (or by) non-dominant firms
but note that it may be necessary to withdraw the vertical block exemption "in situations where
the buyer has significant market power and imposes exclusive supply obligations upon its
suppliers." Id at 11, 15.
Hoffman-La Roche, 1979 ECR at 539 ("An undertaking which is in a dominant position on a
market and ties purchasers-even if it does so at their request-by an obligation or promise on
their part to obtain all or most of their requirements exclusively from the said undertaking abuses
its dominant position within the meaning of Article [82].').

165

(2000). See also LorainJournalCov UnitedStates, 342 US 143 (1951).
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Monopoly Agreements") in the Current Draft AML. This provision, Article 9,
prohibits the imposition of "other trading conditions" that materially eliminate
or restrict competition. Clarification of whether the AML is intended to address
exclusive dealing solely under Article 15, or under both Articles 9 and 15, would
be useful in determining whether a non-dominant competitor might run afoul of
the law by entering into an exclusive supply arrangement. An explanation of
what constitutes a "justification" rendering exclusive dealing lawful would also
be helpful.
The prohibition on tying, or imposing "unreasonable conditions" in a
manner "contrary to the will of the trading partners" under Article 15(v) appears
designed primarily to attack "coerced" tying. Under US law, most courts have
required proof that the buyer was forced to buy the "tied" product in order to
be permitted to buy the "tying" product. 166 The EC law of tying (as contrasted
with "soft bundling") resembles US law in that it requires the presence of two
separate products in different product markets, a seller that is dominant in the
tying product market, the preclusion of the buyer's option to purchase only the
tying product (without the tied product), and proof that the tying caused actual
foreclosure of competition.167 Although the Current Draft AML does not specify
the elements required for a finding of tying in violation of the Anti-Monopoly
Law, it is hoped that implementing regulations will provide guidance that
accords with international competition law norms exemplified by US and EC
laws.
Article 15(v)'s prohibition on the imposition of "unreasonable conditions"
is troublingly vague. It gives parties no guidance about the types of conditions
that may be considered unreasonable and seems as likely to stifle innovative,
procompetitive arrangements as it is to stop anticompetitive activity. This
language, like that contained in other less definite provisions of the Current
Draft AML, should be removed or clarified through regulations.
Article 15(vi) prohibits "applying differentiated treatment" to "equivalent
trading partners," absent valid reasons, where such conduct puts some entities at
a "competitive disadvantage." In the United States, section 2 of the RobinsonPatman Act'68 provides a somewhat similar prohibition on price discrimination.
The Robinson-Patman Act is frequently criticized as bad competition policy and

166 See, for example, Suburban Propanev Proctor Gas, Inc, 953 F2d 780, 788-89 (2d Cir 1992) (affirming

grant of summary judgment for defendant because there was no proof that any buyer had felt
compelled to purchase the tied product in order to get the tying product).
167 Commission Decision COMP/C-3/37.792, 2004 OJ (210), available online at <http://
(visited May 7,
europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf>
2006).
168 15 USC § 13(a)-13(b), 21(a) (2000).
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as an extremely difficult statute to administer. One commentator describes its
origins and current unfavorable reputation as follows:
The Robinson-Patman Act was enacted as an antitrust law during the Great
Depression of the 1930s in response to intensive lobbying by independent
wholesalers, brokers, and retailers who complained of price discrimination
by their suppliers, who favored the large chains. Since its enactment in 1936,
the Act has been the object of unrelenting criticism by legal scholars and
economists. Critics charge that the Act has been invoked to protect
individual competitors and to deprive consumers of low prices, a course
they view as in direct conflict with the basic goals of antitrust law:
protecting competition, not competitors, and advancing the consumer
welfare. Indeed, during the period from 1955 through 1979, various
presidential, executive department, and bar association task forces
recommended partial repeal or radical revision of the Act. Despite the
criticism and calls for repeal or revision, at the threshold of the twenty-first
century, the Robinson-Patman Act remains structurally intact. 169
Given that the Robinson-Patman Act was born of concern for
competitors, not competition, it should come as no surprise that the
consequences of enforcing this price discrimination statute have been roundly
and repeatedly criticized as being inconsistent with, and indeed antithetical to,
sound competition policy. As Judge Bork has noted: "[N]o other antitrust
statute has been subjected to so steady a barrage of hostile commentary as the
Robinson-Patman Act. Indeed, the scholarly and professional literature on the
170
statute resembles a cascade of vituperation.'
Given that the law has not been repealed by Congress, but reflecting broad
consensus that the law conflicts with general antitrust principles, the US
Supreme Court has, in recent decades, consistently sought to narrow the
application of the Robinson-Patman Act. It has resisted an "interpretation
geared more to the protection of existing competitors than to the stimulation of
competition' ' 17 ' and has construed the Act "consistently with the broader policies
of the antitrust laws.' ' 172 The high court's "interpretation," which seeks to ensure
that enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act reflects broad antitrust policies
concerned with interbrand competition (not intrabrand competition) and
promotes price competition (not price uniformity and rigidity), may do injury to
the literal meaning of the statute. However, the Supreme Court has striven to

169

Paul H. LaRue, Robinson-PatmanAct in the Tweno-First Century: Will the Morton Salt Rule be Refired?,

170

48 SMU L Rev 1917 (1995). See also Wesley J. Liebeler, Let's RepealIt,45 Antitrust LJ 18 (1976).
Robert H. Bork, The Anitrust Paradox:A Polfy at War with Itsef 385 (Basic Books 1978) (internal

171

citations omitted).
Volvo Trucks North American, Inc v Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc, 126 S Ct 860, 872 (2006) (emphasis in

original).
172

Id at 873, quoting Brooke Group, 509 US at 220.
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construe the Robinson-Patman Act in a manner that does not undermine the
primary goals of antitrust law: consumer welfare and allocative efficiency, not
the protection of small or inefficient enterprises.' 73
Moreover, under US law, both statutory and court-created defenses
recognize competitive realities necessitating or justifying price discrimination.
Such defenses include meeting competition, cost justification, changing
conditions, and practical availability, as well as discounts justified by functions
performed for the seller by the buyer, and promotional allowances.' 74
The language of Article 15(vi) is apparently based on Article 82(c) of the
EC Treaty, which prohibits "applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent
transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive
disadvantage."' 7 5 The European Commission has condemned price
discrimination by dominant firms under this provision without considering
whether or not the different prices resulted from a fidelity rebate scheme.'7 6 The
provision has been enforced against pricing that has been found to place the
discriminator's customers at a disadvantage vis- -vis their competitors
("secondary-line discrimination") as well as against discrimination that injures
the discriminator's competitors ("primary-line discrimination").' 7 7 As in the US,
the European Commission and European courts have recognized various
defenses and justifications for price discrimination (and other dissimilar nonprice conditions, including meeting competition and "objective justification" for
rebate schemes).' 78
Notwithstanding the limitations to, and defenses available under, US and
EC discrimination law, those laws are routinely criticized as giving rise to claims
(and decisions) inconsistent with the consumer welfare goals of competition
policy. Given the absence of such defenses and limitations in the Current Draft
AML, the risk of unintended anticompetitive consequences from this statute

173

See also ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Monograph No 4, I The Robinson-PatmanAct: Poliy and
Law (ABA 1980); ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Monograph No 4, II The Robinson-PatmanAct:
Po/ioand Law (ABA 1983).

174 See generally ABA, I Antitrust Law Developments at 455-523 (cited in note 118).
175

EC Treaty, art 82(c) (cited in note 72).

176

Hoffman-La Roche 1979 ECR at 540; Commission Decision 97/624, 1997 OJ (L258) 1, 21-25;

177

Michelin, 1983 ECR at 3513.
See, for example, British Airways ple v

Commission, Case T-219/99,

available

online at

<http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit=Rechercher&a~ldocs=alldocs&
docj=docj&docop=docop&docor=docor&docjo=docjo&numaff=T-219/99&datefs=&datefe=
&nomusuel=&domaine=&mots=&resmax=100> (visited May 7, 2006); Commission Decision
178

88/138, 1998 OJ (L65) 19, 37.
See generally Van Bael & Bellis, Competition Law 5§ 8.7(2)-(4) at 914-34 (cited in note 99).
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would seem to be even greater, but these concerns could be mitigated through
implementing regulations.
The final subpart of Article 15 ("other abuses of [a] dominant market
position") would not be as troubling as it appears if the AML or its
implementing regulations were to require a modern economics-based and
effects-based analysis of harm to competition as a prerequisite to finding an
abuse. Absent any assurances about what exactly might constitute an "abuse" or
how such a conclusion may be arrived at, this vague provision renders
meaningful counseling on compliance with Chapter III extremely difficult.
F. MERGER REVIEW
Chapter IV ("Prohibition of Concentrations of Undertakings"), which
spans from Articles 16 through 24, contains the Current Draft AML's merger
control provisions, including procedures and substantive tests for approving or
rejecting a proposed concentration. This comprehensive and competitionfocused merger control regime will presumably supersede the abandoned
Provisional Rules. 7 9 Chapter IV has undergone substantial revisions since the
October 2002 Draft AML, and most of these revisions have helped to
significantly align the latest draft AML with the international norms exemplified
by the ICN's Recommended Practices. 8 °
"Situations18 ' of Concentrations of Undertakings" are defined in Article 16
as: "(1) a merger of undertakings; (2) an undertaking's acquisition of voting
shares or assets of one or more other undertakings to an adequate extent; (3) an
acquisition of control of other undertakings by contract, technology or other
means, or the capability of imposing material effects on competition."
Clarification of the terms "adequate extent" in subpart (2) and "control" in
subpart (3) is necessary in order for entities to determine whether or not a given
transaction falls within the requirements of this Chapter. In addition, the
reference to "entrusted operation" in subpart (3) could potentially subject the
establishment of management contracts to the merger control requirements. If
179

180

181

See Sheng Jiemen, How Does the Chinese Government Regulate Foreign Investors' M&A of Domestic
Enterprises (on file with author) (stating that the draft Anti-Monopoly Law's provisions will "only
l "not
consider whether the merger or concentration will hinder competition or not" and
consider the nationality of applicants").
International Competition Network, Guiding Principlesand Recommended Practicesfor Merger Nolificaion
and Review Procedures, available online at <http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/
guidingprinciples.html> (visited May 7, 2006). See also ABA 2005 Comments at 21-26 (cited in
note 60) (discussing the many desirable changes from the October 2002 Draft AML to the April
8, 2005 Draft AML and noting that these modifications have generally been retained in the
Current Draft AML).
A more accurate translation may be "forms" in lieu of "situations."
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this interpretation reflects the drafters' intent, such a provision would plainly be
out of sync with comparable laws in other major jurisdictions and would appear
to be inconsistent with the intended purpose of merger control regulationnamely to assess the competitive effects of any increase in market concentration
stemming from a change in control (beneficial ownership or the power to make
decisions typically reserved to owners of a business). Finally, the intended
purpose of the reference to "the capability of imposing material effects on
competition" in subpart 3 is unclear.
Article 17 ("Standard for Notification and Calculation of Turnover Etc.")
sets forth the "size of transaction" and "size of parties" prerequisites for a
required filing. It provides as follows:
A prior notification shall be filed with the Anti-monopoly Law
Enforcement Authority under the State Council by the undertakings of the
concentration where a concentration of undertakings meets any of the
following standards:
(1) the value of the transaction involved in the concentration is more than
RMB 400 million, the total assets of one party undertaking of the
concentration in China's domestic market or total turnover in the preceding
year exceeds RMB 1.5 billion, and any other party undertaking's total assets
in China's domestic market or total turnover in the preceding year exceeds
RMB 500 million;
(2) the value of the transaction inside China for the concentration is above
RMB 1.5 billion.
(3) where there is no value of the transaction of the concentration of the
undertakings, or the value of the transaction of the concentration does not
reach the amount stipulated in above Paragraph (1) [or] Paragraph (2), [and]
the aggregate assets or turnover in the preceding year in China's domestic
market exceeds RMB 5 billion.
In order to calculate the total assets and turnover mentioned in the
preceding paragraphs, it shall include the assets and turnover of all the
undertakings with which the undertaking has controlling or affiliation
relationships.
The Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council
may adjust the standard for notification of concentrations of undertakings
stipulated in the preceding Paragraph 1, in light of the economic
development and market situations, and report such adjustments to the
State Council for approval before putting them into practice.
Although subpart (1) does not expressly provide a threshold that is
applicable to the acquired party, it would appear to require that the acquired
party have an annual turnover of at least RMB 500 million, bringing the
procedure into compliance with ICN Recommended Practice I. This
Recommended Practice is intended to ensure that only concentrations having a
meaningful nexus with competition within the reviewing jurisdiction are subject
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to mandatory review.'82 Moreover, the Current Draft AML abandons the
alternative market-share based test of Article 24(3) and (4) in the April 8, 2005
Draft AML, bringing the Current Draft AML into conformity with ICN
Recommended Practice 11.' 83 However, a clear definition of "control" is
necessary for entities to assess which undertakings are to be included within the
calculation of turnovers that is used to determine whether the materiality
thresholds are met.
Article 18 ("Exemption of Notification") provides as follows:
If a concentration of undertakings fulfills any of the following
circumstances, the undertakings need not file the notification with the AntiMonopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council:
(1) Among the undertakings involved in the concentration, one
undertaking owns more than 50% of the voting shares or the assets of each
and every other undertaking; [or]
(2) More than 50% of the entire voting shares or the assets of [ every
undertaking to the transaction are owned by one undertaking which is not
involved in the concentration.
Article 18 exempts transactions that would otherwise be caught under the
definition of "concentration"-essentially intra-company reorganizations.
However, if applied literally, this Article would also apparently have the
(presumably unintended) consequence of exempting all mergers between SOEs
since all SOEs are controlled by the same parent.
Articles 19 through 24 provide the procedures for notification and review,
beginning with the filing of an application (including a competitive assessment, a
summary of the agreement, audited financial and accounting information for the
preceding accounting year, and "other information required by the AntiMonopoly Law Enforcement Authority'). Under Article 20, if a filing is deemed
incomplete, the Authority will request supplemental information within fifteen
days after the initial filing. An application is deemed received when determined
to be complete. The Anti-Monopoly Authority will then undertake a preliminary
review under Article 21. The Authority must decide whether to initiate further
review within twenty working days after receipt of the application, and it must
inform the applicants of its decision in writing. In the interim, the parties are
precluded from implementing the transaction. If the Authority makes no
decision within this time, the parties are free to implement the concentration.
Under Article 22, if the Authority initiates a further review in a timely manner, it
must notify the parties. The Authority must then approve or block the
transaction within ninety working days after the date of its decision to undertake
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International Competition Network, Guiding Priniplesand Recommended Practices (cited in note 180).
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a further review. The Authority has discretion to extend that period by no more
than thirty working days if: the parties consent to the extension, the documents
submitted are inaccurate or require further verification, or the "relevant
circumstances" have changed significantly after notification. Under Article 24,
the Authority must publish any decision approving a concentration, and it must
notify the parties of a decision, whether an approval or a prohibition, in writing.
The approval may include restrictive conditions. Any decision blocking a
transaction must include reasons for the denial. All of these provisions, including
the narrowing of categories of information required for initial review, reflect
substantial improvements from earlier drafts and are largely consistent with both
the ICN Recommended Practices and the approach of most major competition
law regimes. In this respect, the Current Draft AML's general alignment with the
merger control regulations of other major jurisdictions will significantly lessen
the burden and disruption that would have likely ensued if any of the earlier
drafts of these provisions had been codified.
Article 25 of the September 30, 2005 Draft AML provided a substantive
test for prohibition of a concentration, as follows:
The Anti-Monopoly Authority under the State Council shall make a
decision to prohibit a concentration where the concentration will
substantially eliminate or restrict competition within the relevant market.
The Anti-Monopoly Authority under the State Council shall make its
decision on whether to prohibit a concentration based on the following
factors:
(1) the market shares of the undertakings participating in the concentration
on the relevant market and their ability to control the market;
(2) the extent of concentration in the relevant market;
(3) the likelihood of competition on the relevant market as a result of the
proposed concentration;
(4) the effect of the proposed concentration on market access and
technological progress;
(5) the effect of the proposed concentration on consumers, upstream and
downstream undertakings;
(6) rationales for the concentration and improvement in economic
efficiency which is likely to make [sic]; and
(7) the effect of the proposed concentration on the development of the
national economy and public interest.
This explicit list of factors was a useful outline of considerations for the
Authority to take into account during its decision-making process. For unknown
reasons, the list was deleted from the Current Draft AML and replaced with a
short provision, Article 23, which merely provides that:
The Anti-Monopoly Authority under the State Council shall make a
decision to prohibit a concentration and explain the reasons where the
concentration of the undertakings will substantially eliminate or restrict
competition in the relevant market.
Summer 2006
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If the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council
decides to approve the concentration the Authority can attach restrictive
conditions to the implementation of the concentration.
As with the US Merger Guidelines, perhaps later regulations or guidelines
will provide notifying parties with greater certainty regarding the Authority's
standards and its weighting of particular considerations when analyzing
concentrations. Such measures will hopefully assist parties in structuring
transactions that will pass muster under the Authority's approach or will guide
parties to forego transactions that are unlikely to be approved."8
G. ADMINISTRATIVE ABUSES
Chapter V of the September 30, 2005 Draft AML ("Prohibition of Abuse
of Administrative Powers to Restrict Competition") prohibited abuses of the
powers of Chinese governmental organizations that eliminate or restrict
competition. However, this Chapter had excised an explicit prohibition of
administrative monopolies that had been present in a similar chapter of the
preceding draft AML. For example, Article 35 of the April 8, 2005 Draft AML
provided as follows: "The Government and its subordinate departments shall
not promulgate rules with provisions eliminating or limiting competition in
violation of laws and administrative regulations so as to prevent the
establishment of a unified and orderly national market and of a fair competitive
environment."
Unfortunately, the entire chapter proscribing administrative monopolies
has been deleted from the Current Draft AML. The provisions in this chapter, if
implemented, might have significantly addressed the competitive distortions
resulting from various practices of SOEs and the likely broad exemptions of
certain sectors of the Chinese economy. The enactment of these provisions
would undoubtedly have sparked significant political opposition.'8 5 A few
commentators have stated that a separate statute prohibiting administrative
monopolies may be promulgated." 6 But it appears that the opportunity to pass
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For a thorough treatment of the merger review process under US law, see Ilene K. Gotts, ed, The
Meiger Review Process (ABA 2d ed 2001) and Neil W. Imus, ed, Preme~gerNotification Practice Manual
(ABA 3d ed 2003). Regarding the substantive US antitrust law governing concentrations, see
Robert S. Schlossberg, ed, Mergers and Acquisitions: Understanding the Antitrust Issues (ABA 2d ed
2004).
See Bei Hu, China Unveils Competition Rules; ObserversFear PoliticalResistance May Delay Implementation

186

of the Country's First Antitrust Law, South China Morning Post, Business Post 1 (July 2, 2003)
(quoting one observer as saying that "the government's encouragement of competition could be
hampered by its need to support state-owned enterprises identified as China's first
multinationals.').
Comments of Prof ShengJiemen to representatives of the American Bar Association, at the ABA
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such measures in conjunction with the rollout of the new Anti-Monopoly Law
may have been lost. This revision severely undermines the extent to which the
new competition law regime can play a substantial role in China's transition to a
market economy, and it apparently reflects a continuing desire by some officials
to attempt to control the market as it affects government-related enterprises.' 87
The entire chapter that was focused on administrative monopolies in the
earlier draft AMLs has been replaced with a provision in Article 2 ("Scope of
Application") stating that the AML "applies when activities of undertakings fall
outside the provisions of the laws or administrative regulations of relevant
industries or sectors, eliminating or restricting competition." The language in
Chapter I ("General Provisions") of the September 30, 2005 Draft AML that
had prohibited "the administrative organs and other organizations granted the
public affairs administration power by laws and regulations from conduct that
abuses administrative power to exclude or restrict competition"'' 88 has also been
deleted from the Current Draft AML. There appears to be reason for concern
that these revisions could create a de facto exemption of a substantial segment
of the Chinese economy.
The deletion of the anti-administrative monopoly provisions is seen as a
victory for the so-called "elimination through reform" side, which asserts that
economic monopolies should be the sole focus of the Anti-Monopoly Law. This
group reportedly believes that because administrative monopolies "resulted from
the evolution of political and economic systems in the transitional period, it [sic]
must therefore be eliminated through further system restructuring." The
opposing "legislative enforcement" group argues that the Anti-Monopoly Law
must "take into account the unique Chinese situations"-such as administrative
monopolies and regional blockages. The final decision to remove these
provisions from the draft was said to be based primarily on concerns about
providing effective legal liability for administrative monopolies. Although both
sides reportedly favor eliminating administrative monopolies, with the
abandonment of these provisions in the Anti-Monopoly Law, advocates hope to
address the administrative monopoly issue through separate legislation and
regulations. A member of the Anti-Monopoly Law drafting team and another
person close to the LAO have expressed pessimism about the likelihood of

187 Compare Stanley B. Lubman, Bird in a Cage at 182 (discussing SAIC's position that it should be
able to 'supervise and manage' contracts in which one party is a state or collective enterprise and
which could injure 'state interests"') (cited in note 36).
188 September 30, 2005 Draft AML, art 3.
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success for such efforts in light of the failure to achieve meaningful results
through other legislative initiatives targeting administrative monopolies.'89
Other jurisdictions have balanced the state's interest in displacing the
application of competition law under certain circumstances where plainly
intended in order to serve another societal interest. This approach would
continue to provide the benefits of antitrust law where no such express
9 °
exemption is intended. Under US law, for example, the state action doctrine
provides an exemption for private and state economic actors where the conduct
is undertaken "pursuant to a 'clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy' to replace competition with regulation"'' and "the policy [of displacing
competition is] 'actively supervised' by the state itself."' 92 The requirement of
active supervision is intended to ensure that the exemptions are the product of
purposeful and closely overseen state control and are "not simply [the result of]
agreement among private parties."' 93 The wholesale removal of the chapter
addressing administrative monopolies ignores, at least in the short term, the
need to ensure that state-protected regional monopolies that engage in business
conduct do not, in the absence of any actual determination by the government
of a need for their exemption, and without any requirement of ongoing
governmental supervision of their activities under such an exemption, engage in
anticompetitive conduct with impunity.
H. THE ANTI-MONOPOLY AUTHORITY
Chapter V of the Current Draft AMIL ("Anti-Monopoly Authority"),
comprising Articles 25 through 38, establishes and sets out the basic powers and
procedures of the antitrust enforcement agency of China, known as the AntiMonopoly Law Enforcement Authority, and the Anti-Monopoly Committee
under the State Council ("Committee"). During the AML drafting process, there
was considerable debate about how many enforcement agencies there should be
and which, if any, existing government body should be in charge of such an
agency or agencies. All recent previous drafts provided for a single agency under
the aegis of the State Council. However, the Current Draft AML introduces the
Committee, which, according to Article 25, is "composed of the principals of
relevant departments and organs of the State Council and certain experts."
189

The 'Ani-Administrative Monopoly" Section Compktely Removed from the Ani-Monopoy Law to Ease Its

Burden, Beijing News (Jan 11, 2006).
190 See generally ABA, I Antitrst Law Developments, 12, 13-22 (cited in note 118).
191 Hoover v Ronwin, 466 US 558, 569 (1984) (4 to 3 decision) (citation omitted).
192 California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn v MidcalAluminum, Inc, 445 US 97, 105 (1980) (citation and
footnote omitted).
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While its "rules of procedures and work are stipulated by the State Council," the
involvement of multiple agencies and experts raises concerns about inefficient
oversight and the possible inconsistent direction of competition policy. The
authorization of multiple agencies also risks the Authority's independence
although the State Council's express oversight of all these activities should to
some extent mitigate that concern.194 Finally, reliance upon the contemplated
Anti-Monopoly Committee, comprising representatives of numerous entities
with varying political goals and priorities, may also entail the politicization of
competition policy, perhaps risking the use of competition enforcement as a
weapon in trade disputes, for example.'95
Under Article 26 of the Current Draft AML, the Committee will perform
the following functions:
(1) formulating policies relating to competition, putting forward legislative
proposals on anti-monopoly laws and administrative regulations;
(2) organizing investigation[s], evaluation [of] the overall competition
condition[s] in [the] market, and publish[ing] ... evaluation reports;
(3) Supervising, coordinating the enforcement activities of the Antimonopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council and the
relevant industrial regulators of the State Council;
(4) Deciding [of] major anti-monopoly cases; [and]
(5) Other functions stipulated by the State Council.
Article 27 of the Current Draft AMIL sets out the functions of the
Authority as follows: "(1) putting forward and publish[ing] anti-monopoly
regulations, rules and specific measures; (2) accepting and reviewing notification
of concentrations of the undertakings; (3) investigating and handling
Monopolistic Conducts; (4) investigating and evaluating marketing competition
conditions; (5) other functions stipulated by the State Council."
It is unclear which specific entities and experts will constitute the
Committee or which agencies will assume certain roles within the Authority.
194

It would be difficult to establish a truly independent authority, even if only a single agency was to
be created. See Wang Xue Zheng, Challenges! Obstacles Faced by Competition Authorities in Achieving
Greater Economic Development through the Promotion of Competition, (an 9, 2004), available online at
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/51/23727203.pdf> (visited May 7, 2006), stating that
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A totally neutral or independent competition authority is ... difficult to
imagine in China because of the current political system. All officials or
authorities, except the State Council, must accept the leadership or guidance
from their higher authority, so does the competition authority [sic]. The higher
authority of the competition authority would possibly put other values on top
of competition value in some occasions [sic].
Regarding continuing concerns about the politicization of trade disputes involving China, see
generally Peter K. Yu, Conference-U.S.-CbinaTrade: Opportunities and Challenges:Still Dissatisledafter
All These Years: Intellectual Property, Post-WTO China, and the Avoidable Cycle of Futiifty, 34 Ga J Ind &
Comp L 143 (2005).
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However, based on statements by Chinese officials, it is anticipated that
MOFCOM and the SCDR will play substantial roles in analysis and enforcement
activities, and that SAIC, as well as MOFCOM and other entities under the aegis
of the State Council, will continue to be involved within the Committee during
the policy review and development stages. Broader concerns about the
Authority's ability to implement the law in a transparent, consistent manner stem
from well-known difficulties9 6that China has encountered in developing a lawbased administrative system.
Article 28 requires that officials working in the Authority be "faire, [sic]
decent, honest and faithful, equipped with legal and economic knowledge and
education background, and with more than 3 years related working experience in
legal and economic sectors." This last requirement is encouraging because the
AML's success in facilitating China's transition to a market-based economy
depends to a significant degree on the extent to which the Authority can ensure
that the Anti-Monopoly Law is enforced in a manner consistent with modern
economic principles. Application of these principles requires a staff capable of
rigorous economic analysis. In that sense, the qualifications required under
Article 28, if implemented, may prove as important a contributor to the new
law's success as any of its substantive or procedural provisions.
Article 29 permits "[a]ny organizations or individuals" to report, in
confidence, violations of the law to the Authority. If a report is in writing and
includes "related facts and necessary evidencefl," the Authority "shall conduct
196 See Randall Peerenboom, Globaliation,Path Dependeny and the Limits of Law: Administrative Law
Reform and the Rule of Law in the People's Repubhc of China, 19 Berkeley J Ind L 161, 168-69 (2001).
Mr. Peerenboom argues that:
The biggest obstacles to a law-based administrative system in China are
institutional and systemic in nature: a legislative system in disarray; a weak
judiciary; poorly trained judges and lawyers; the absence of a robust civil
society populated by interests groups; a low level of legal consciousness; the
persistent influence of paternalistic traditions and a culture of deference to
government authority; rampant corruption; and the fallout from the
unfinished transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy,
which has exacerbated central-local tensions and resulted in fragmentation of
authority.
See also Wang Jiafu, The Construction of a Legal System for China's Market Economy, 3 Wash U Global
Stud L Rev 297, 305-06 (2004) (noting the need to improve the enforcement of law and increase
the judiciary's powers in order to effectuate Chinese economic laws). See also James M.
Zimmerman, China Law Deskbook: A Legal Guidefor Foreign-InvestedEnterprises 38-39 (ABA 1999)
(noting that under Article 128 of the Chinese Constitution, "the People's Courts, including the
Supreme People's Court, are not allowed to interpret the Constitution. Only the NPC and its
Standing Committee have the power."). See generally Randall Peerenboom, China's Long March
toward Rule of Law (Cambridge 2002). Regarding the possible influence of ancient Chinese
traditions upon current efforts to reestablish an independent judiciary and strong rule of law, see
Jerome Alan Cohen, R. Randle Edwards, and Fu-mei Chang Chen, Essays on China's Legal
Traditions (Princeton 1980). Professor Cohen's introductory chapter is particularly illuminating.
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necessary investigation." The Authority has been granted significant police
powers to investigate suspected violations under Article 30 ("Investigatory
Functions and Powers"), which reads as follows:
When conducting investigations of the suspect Monopolistic Conduct, the
Anti-Monopoly Authority [sic] can take the following measures:
(1) conducting investigations of business locations or other relevant places
of the undertakings;
(2) requesting the undertakings, interested parties and other relevant entities
or individuals subject to the investigation to submit relevant documents and
information including related documents, agreements, contracts, accounting
books, correspondence, electronic data etc. and receive questioning;
(3) examining, copying, digesting, sealing or retaining relevant evidence;
(4) inquiring about the bank account information of the undertakings; [and]
(5) sealing up the business locations of the undertakings concerned.
It is unclear whether subpart (5) is intended to permit the closing of a
business location before any decision of wrongdoing is reached. If so, this
provision may raise serious concerns about the fundamental fairness of the
process. It is hoped that, in practice, the "sealing" will apply only to files and
other evidence that must legitimately be preserved to ensure the integrity of the
investigation.
Major jurisdictions' antitrust enforcement agencies have dramatically
increased their caseloads through the use of leniency or amnesty programs,
which provide immunity or a reduction in fines to participants in antitrust cartels
that report the violation and cooperate with investigators and enforcement
authorities. The establishment of a leniency program to encourage the disclosure
of violations was suggested in a paper submitted by the Antitrust Division of the
US Department of Justice during the International Seminar on Anti-Monopoly
Legislation, and it was suggested that such a program would increase the rate at
which violations are detected. 19 7 The Current Draft AML does not include a
detailed leniency system providing the type of predictable benefits from
reporting that will likely engender much self-reporting. However, as discussed
below, Article 39 states that parties guilty of entering into monopoly agreements
in violation of Article 8, but that self-report their illegal actions, may receive a
"mitigated punishment or be exempted from punishment.., in accordance with
the circumstances." The Authority could increase the likelihood that
undertakings would take advantage of leniency by promulgating implementing
regulations that assure specific lenient treatment for the first self-reporter of a
violation, as under US practice. The Authority could possibly offer lesser
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See PresentationConcerning InvestigationProceduresand Remedies, Antitrust Division, US Department of
Justice (May 23, 2005) (on file with author).
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rewards for a certain number of subsequent self-reporters, following the practice
of the European Commission, Japan, and other jurisdictions.
Article 31 requires at least two investigating officers from the Authority to
carry out investigations, and it mandates that these officers present valid
documents and make a written record when conducting questioning. Article 32
requires the Authority and its staff to maintain the confidentiality of commercial
secrets obtained in the course of their duties.
Under Article 33 of the Current Draft AML, parties under investigation, as
well as interested parties and "other relevant entities or individuals subject to the
investigation" (presumably witnesses, competitors, suppliers, and customers, as
well as any others having knowledge about the relevant market or alleged
anticompetitive practices) are required to cooperate with the Authority and are
precluded from refusing to cooperate or hindering the investigation. Article 34
allows both the undertakings under investigation and interested parties to submit
"statements and defenses."
Article 35 of the Current Draft AML provides as follows: "Where the AntiMonopoly Law Enforcement Authority after investigating the suspect[ed]
Monopolistic Conduct determines the conduct constitutes [ Monopolistic
Conduct[] prohibited by this Law, it shall make a decision in accordance with
this Law, and publish the decision to the public."
It would be preferable for this provision to include a standard of proof and
a requirement that the Authority include its detailed reasoning, findings of fact,
and application of law in its decision. This is not only an issue of fairness for
those found to have violated the law. Such decisions will be considered an
important source for understanding the Authority's methods of analysis, and
when there is a subsequent challenge, the decisions will serve as an important
basis for a court to understand and assess the correctness (or erroneousness) of
the Authority's decision.
Article 36 of the Current Draft AML sets forth the "System of
Undertaking by the Undertakings" as follows:
If the undertaking subject to the investigation admits the suspect[ed]
Monopolistic ConductH being invest[igated] by the Anti-Monopoly Law
Enforcement Authority and undertakes to take specific measures within [a]
certain time limit to eliminate the effect of the Monopolistic Conductfl, the
Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority can make the decision to
suspend the investigation; if it is subject to punishment pursuant to this
Law, the punishment shall be reduced or relieved. The decision of the
suspension of the investigation shall state the detailed content of the
undertaking.
The Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall supervise the
conditions of the performance of the undertaking by the undertakings. If
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the undertakings do not perform the undertaking, the Anti-Monopoly Law
Enforcement Authority shall restore' 98 the investigation.
Especially in the context of the establishment of the first comprehensive
antitrust regime in the country, the availability of consensual settlement of a
matter under investigation is a sensible option, and this provision should reduce
the new Authority's caseload. The Current Draft AML has deleted certain
specific grounds, described in the September 30, 2005 Draft AML, that would
have allowed an investigation to be resumed even under circumstances in which
the parties had complied with the undertaking, including if there had been
"substantial changes in the facts" and apparently without regard to whether the
defendant had played any role in causing such changes to come about. Such a
risk that the investigation would be resumed for uncontrollable reasons would
likely have constituted a substantial deterrent to seeking a resolution through
undertakings. Under the Current Draft AML, breach of the undertaking is
apparently the sole ground for reopening a specific investigation.
Article 37 of the Current Draft AML creates a right of administrative
reconsideration or "administrative litigations in accordance with law" for
"undertakings concerned and interested parties" that are "dissatisfied with
decisions" of the Authority. None of the personnel, procedures, or substantive
criteria for such an administrative review is described in the Current Draft AML.
Such requirements should be included in implementing regulations in order to
ensure that the review is carried out by a truly independent and unbiased panel
or individual and that there is procedural fairness. In contrast, the October 2002
Draft AML provided for a review within sixty days of the receipt of a decision
and specified that an aggrieved party had a subsequent right to appeal to the
People's Court within fifteen days of receiving the reconsideration decision. 99
The September 30, 2005 Draft AML unambiguously provided for judicial
review 200 and some participants in various seminars on earlier drafts of the AML
emphasized the perceived need for an express right to judicial review.
Nevertheless, the absence of such a clear provision in the Current Draft AML
may not be a serious concern because the Administrative Litigation Law and
Administrative Review Law ("Administrative Laws") provide detailed
procedures for court remedies. The omission of express provisions for court
review in the Current Draft AML thus presumably results from avoiding the
repetition of those laws' provisions, and judicial review of administrative
decisions under the Anti-Monopoly Law, as with all other laws, will be available

198 "Resume" may be a more accurate translation that "restore."
199 October 2002 Draft AML, art 53.
200

September 30, 2005 Draft AML, art 44.
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in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Administrative Laws.2 °'
Chinese experts have commented that the right to administrative litigation
incorporates the right to subsequent judicial review under the Administrative
22
Laws since administrative litigation is also conducted within the court system.
Finally, there may be redress to the state through the constitutional right to
lodge complaints and the right of compensation for losses suffered by state
action.203
A related concern arises from the Chinese judiciary's dearth of experience
and lack of training in competition law concepts. The creation of a specially
trained court with jurisdiction limited to Anti-Monopoly Law cases would
provide a more reliable path to consistent, high-quality antitrust jurisprudence
than reliance on the widely scattered People's Courts of general jurisdiction.
Establishment of such a court would generally be consistent with the recently
announced creation, by the China Supreme Court, of a Judicial Court of
Intellectual Property to adjudicate intellectual property litigation throughout the
country, although that court is apparently expected to have concurrent
jurisdiction with local courts over IP matters.20 4
Article 38 ("Relationship between the Anti-Monopoly Authority and
Relevant Authorities") provides as follows:
If there are relevant laws and administrative regulations stipulating that the
Monopolistic Conducto prohibited by this Law shall be investigated and
handled by the industrial directing departments or supervisory organs of the
State Council, the laws and regulations are to be applied. The relevant
201

202

203

204

For a discussion about the rights of legal persons to judicial review of administrative acts under
the Administrative Litigation Law of the People's Republic of China and efforts to address
challenges to China's compliance with its WTO commitment to independent judicial review, see
Veron Mei-Ying Hung, China's If/TO Commitment on IndependentJudicial Review: Impact on Legal and
PoliticalReform, 52 Am J Comp L 77 (2004).
China's People's Courts are comprised of three sections: criminal, civil, and administrative.
Regarding the general structure of the Chinese judicial system, see Stanley B. Lubman, Bird in a
Cage at 251-53 (cited in note 36).
Under the 1982 PRC Constitution, the state is obligated to investigate complaints concerning a
"violation of law or dereliction of duty by any state organ or functionary." The same constitution
restored from the 1954 Constitution the "right of compensation for loss suffered through
infringement of rights by the actions of state employees." However, these rights may obtain only
to Chinese citizens, as, conceptually, rights are considered to be derived from citizenship, not
"human personhood." See R. Randle Edwards, Louis Henkin, and Andrew J. Nathan, Human
Rights in Contemporary China 117, 121 (Columbia 1986).
See China to Open Ani-Piragy Court, BBC News (Mar 10, 2006), available online at <http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4793530.stm> (visited May 7, 2006). See also Justice Cheng
Yong-Shun, Comment: JucrhcalProtection of IntellectualPropertj in China, 9 Duke J Comp & Intl L 267
(1998) (describing the creation of the Intellectual Property Trial Division in the Supreme People's
Court and discussing the Supreme Court and provincial higher courts' efforts to train judges in
intellectual property law).
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departments and supervisory organs of the State Council shall notify the
result of the investigation on the Monopolistic Conduct to the AntiMonopoly Law Enforcement Authority under the State Council.
Where the relevant departments and supervisory organs of the State Council
fail to investigate an[d] handle the Monopolistic Conduct[] prohibited by
this Law in accordance with the above paragraph, the Anti-Monopoly Law
Enforcement Authority under the State Council could conduct the
investigation and handling. When investigating and handling of the
Monopolistic Conduct[], the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority
under the State Council shall consult for the opinions of the relevant
departments and supervisory organs of the State Council.
In light of the Current Draft AML's deletion of Article 36 of the April 8,
2005 Draft AML, which prohibited the government and its subordinate
departments from promulgating rules eliminating or limiting competition, the
laudable apparent primary purpose of Article 38 of the Current Draft AMLto
prevent a sectoral regulator from "turning a blind eye" to violations of the AntiMonopoly Law by firms within its sector of the economy-may be
circumvented through the establishment of anticompetitive rules or regulations
inconsistent with this law. Article 38 of the Current Draft AML appears to be a
regressive provision when compared with Article 45 of the April 8, 2005 Draft
AML. If this earlier version had become law, the Authority would have exercised
ultimate power over all competition matters, ensuring a more consistent
interpretation and enforcement of the new law throughout all sectors of the
economy. Under current Article 38, sectoral regulators will have the final word
on competition issues related to certain sectors governed by sector-specific laws
and regulations. Telecommunications laws, laws governing the energy sector,
and other laws will supersede national competition policy. Furthermore, sectoral
regulators, many of which have strong interests in protecting certain statecontrolled "champions" from competition, will be tempted to interpret the AntiMonopoly Law differently with respect to favored sectors. The text of Article 38
would appear to be a triumph for the lobbying efforts of sectoral regulators and
participants in particular sectors of the economy. In the short term, this
provision will deprive Chinese consumers of the benefits of a broad and
consistent application of competition policy.
I. LEGAL LIABILITY
Chapter VI2 °5 of the Current Draft AML ("Legal Liability") comprises
Articles 39 through 46, and it sets out the penalties applicable for various types
of violations of the Anti-Monopoly Law. For entering into an unlawful
monopoly agreement, Article 39 prescribes cessation of the unlawful conduct,
205

The chapter is misnumbered as Chapter VII in the English translation of the Current Draft AML.
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confiscation of the illegal gains gleaned from such conduct, and possible fines
not exceeding 10 percent of the firm's turnover in the relevant market in the
preceding year. Punishment of firms that report a monopoly agreement and
provide important evidence to the Authority shall be mitigated or foregone
according to the circumstances.
Under Article 40, abuses of a dominant market position subject the
defendant to cessation of the conduct, confiscation of the illegal gains, and fines
not to exceed 10 percent of the turnover in the relevant market in the preceding
year. For unknown reasons, mitigation for the provision of important evidence
is not expressly provided for defendants guilty of abuses of a dominant position.
Article 41 of the Current Draft AML ("Penalty Against the Concentration
Implemented Violating this Law") obligates parties that implement a
concentration in violation of the law to "correct the situation" and pay fines of
up to RMB 5 million. The Authority may also declare the concentration void or
partially void, order the parties to dispose of some or all of their stock or to
transfer part of the business, or require resignation from a given position within
the company.
Article 42 of the Current Draft AML ("Factors to be Considered for
Fines") provides that the Authority, in imposing fines under Articles 39, 40, or
41, shall take into consideration "the nature, extent and [duration] of the illegal
act."
Article 43 of the Current Draft AML adds teeth to the obligation to
cooperate in an investigation by the Authority, providing as follows:
In case of violating the regulations of this Law, [i]f there is any of the
following conduct], the Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority shall
order it to correct and may impose the fine above 20,000 RMB and below
200,000 RMB on the individuals, above 500,000 RMB and below 5,000,000
RMB on entities in accordance with the seriousness of the situation; [i]f the
conduct [violates] the public security supervision regulations, the police shall
impose security supervisory penalties pursuant to laws:
(1) hinder or refuse to be investigated;
(2) refuse to submit relevant materials and information or submit fraudulent
materials or information; [or]
(3) conceal, destroy or remove.., evidence that [is] sealed.
Article 44 of the Current Draft AML ("Obligations to Compensate the
Injury") provides that violators whose acts cause a "loss to others shall be
responsible for the civil liabilities" to compensate for the injury. This
formulation replaces Articles 49 and 50 of the October 2002 Draft AML and
Article 52 of the April 8, 2005 Draft AML, each of which was more specific than
the Current Draft AML. Article 49 of the October 2002 Draft AML provided as
follows: "If the legal rights and interests of business operators or consumers are

Vol 7 No. 1

The Making of an AntitrustLaw

Harris

damaged by any monopolistic behavior, they can file a petition with the People's
Court."
Article 50 of that draft stated:
If a business operator violates the provisions of this law and injures the
rights and interests of others, the victim can petition the People's Court for
compensation from the business operator for its losses. The amount of
compensation will be the actual loss suffered and the forecasted profit of
the victim. When it is difficult to calculate the loss of the victim, the amount
of compensation will be the profit gained by the perpetrator during the
period when the victim's interests are damaged plus the reasonable expenses
of the victim incurred during the course of investigation and legal
proceedings.
Article 52 of the April 8, 2005 Draft AML provided as follows:
The undertaking that violates the provisions of this law and injures the
rights and interests of others shall make compensations to the victim. The
amount of compensation will be twice of the actual loss suffered by the
victim. When it is difficult to calculate the loss of the victim, the amount of
compensation will be the profit gained by the reasonable expenses of the
victim incurred during the course of investigation and legal proceedings.
The replacement of these earlier drafts with Article 44 of the Current Draft
AML appears to reflect an abandonment of any multiple damages remedies,
perhaps because such remedies are regarded as punitive, not compensatory, but
it is unclear why the Current Draft AML did not return to the "actual loss
suffered and forecasted profit of the victim" language in the October 2002 Draft
AML or why the right to recover the reasonable expenses incurred in legal
proceedings was deleted. The right to resort to the People's Court is no longer
express, although the creation of a civil obligation to make compensation may
support resort to the courts for failure to fulfill such a legal obligation. °6
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A related issue is the need for continued legal reform to ensure that courts are able to undertake
independent, rule-based decision-making on the merits. See Jerome A. Cohen, Chinese LegalReform
at the Crossroads,169 Far E Econ Rev 23, 25 (Mar 2006):
Judges are hired, paid, promoted and fired by local officials.... Usually,
decisions in nonroutine cases are made by administrative superiors within the
court rather than the customary panel of three judges who hear the case. The
court's "adjudication committee," composed of its administrative leaders,
decides sensitive or complex cases behind closed doors after only listening to a
report from the judge in charge of the trial. Outside agencies-including
higher courts as well as the local and central Party apparatus-frequently
influence rulings behind the scenes.
In antitrust cases between local "champions" and foreign competitors (or Chinese competitors
from other regions), conflicts of interest and political pressure may seriously undermine judicial
independence. There are ongoing efforts to address these concerns. See the Second Five-Year
Reform Program for the People's Courts (2004-2008), available online in Chinese at <http://
www.law-lib.com/law/lawview.asp?id= 120832>
(visited
May
7,
2006)
and
<http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=38564>
(partial
English
translation) (visited May 7, 2006). Such initiatives are likely to take years, and likely decades, to
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Article 45 of the Current Draft AML provides for administrative sanctions
if the Authority itself violates the law and causes "serious consequences." This
falls short of the approaches taken in previous drafts. Article 55 ("The
Responsibilities of the Public Servants") of the October 2002 Draft AML
provided as follows:
If staff of the Anti-Monopoly Management Body of the State Council [the
term used in that draft for what is now designated the Authority] abuse their
power, neglect their duties or play favoritism and commit irregularities,
he/she will receive administrative punishment. If it is serious and becomes a
criminal offense, he/she will be prosecuted and penalized accordingly.
Article 53 of the April 8, 2005 Draft AML ("The Responsibilities of the
Enforcers") stated: "In the case that the staff of the Anti-Monopoly Authority
under the State Council violate this law and commit criminal offenses in
executing this law, he/she will be prosecuted and penalized accordingly. If the
violation does not constitute a criminal offense, he/she will receive
administrative punishment."
The stricter formulations in the earlier drafts would have provided the
Chinese public and the parties under investigation, or cooperating with an
investigation, greater assurances of regularity in the Authority's processes and
decision-making.
Article 46 of the Current Draft AML provides that "[c]onduct] in violation
of this Law constituting crime, shall be subject to criminal liability in accordance
with relevant laws and regulations." This provision would appear to ensure that,
just as an antitrust violation in the US may also constitute mail fraud or other
crimes and is punishable as such, a violation of the Anti-Monopoly Law that also
violates criminal laws will be subject to punishment as such.
J. ABUSES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND OTHER
SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS
Chapter V112 °7 of the Current Draft AML ("Supplementary Provisions")
includes several odds and ends, one of which has the potential to be extremely

bear fruit. This Plan includes "upholding the authority of judicial decisions" and [clonstructing
responsibility systems for judges to independendy decide cases. Id. See also Paul Gewirtz, The
U.S.-Cbina Rule of Law Initiative, 11 Wm & Mary Bill of Rts J 603 (2003). One possible approach
to enhancing the independence of competition law jurisprudence is the creation of an
independent Competition Court with judges trained in competition law and economics. China's
Intellectual Property Courts could present a useful precedent. See generally Gregory S. Kolton,

Copynght Law and the People's Courts in the People's Republic of China: A Review and Criique of China's
207

IntellectualProperty Courts, 17 U Pa J Ind Econ L 415 (1996).
This provision is misnumbered at Chapter VIII in the English translation of the Current Draft

AML.
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important. This provision, Article 48 ("Applicability to Abuse of Intellectual
Property Rights"), provides that "[t]his Law is applicable to the conduct[] by
undertakings eliminating or restricting competition by the abuse of the rights
stipulated by the Intellectual Property Right Laws or administrative regulations."
Concerns about China's inadequate protection of intellectual property
rights have been a source of constant friction between China and its principal
trading partners, ° although recent improvements have been noted.20 ' The
Current Draft AML provides no guidance regarding what conduct may be
deemed an "abuse" of IP rights. Earlier drafts of Article 48 gave greater,
although still insufficient, assurance that the enforcement of such rights in
accordance with the laws creating them would not be considered a violation of
the Anti-Monopoly Law. Article 56 of the October 2002 Draft AML stated:
This law is not applicable to the conduct of business operators exploiting
intellectual property in accordance with the copyright law, trademark law
and other laws protecting intellectual property rights. However, this law
shall apply where there is abuse of intellectual property rights with the effect
or potential effect of over-broadly limiting or eliminating competition.
Article 56 of the April 8, 2005 Draft AML provided as follows: "This Law
is not applicable to undertakings who exercise their rights under the Patent Law,
the Trademark Law and the Copyright Law. However, abuse of intellectual
property rights in violation of this Law will be dealt with pursuant to this Law."
The Current Draft AML's deletion of a provision that would have enacted
an extremely broad variant of the essential facilities doctrine may mollify widely
declaimed concerns about the draft law's effect on intellectual property rights,
but greater clarity is still necessary to ensure that owners of IP rights will not be
prosecuted for an "abuse" by merely exercising their rights. Absent such
clarification providing owners of valuable intellectual property rights with the
protection embodied in standards worldwide, there could be a chill in
investments in Chinese markets. Fear produced by the prospect of the
unfettered application of a vague provision like Article 48 may also destroy the
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See generally Jianyang Yu, Protection of Intellectual Propery in the P.R C.: Progress, Problems, and
Proposals,13 UCLA Pac Basin LJ 140 (1994); US General Accounting Office Report, U.S.-China
Trade: Implementation of Agreements on Market Access and Intellectual Propery (an 31, 1995), available
online at <http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/gg95061.pdf> (visited May 7, 2006).
See, for example, Yahong Li, Pushingfor Greater Protection: The Trend toward Greater Protection of
Intellectual Property in the Chinese Software Industry and the Ilicationsfor Rule of Law in China, 23 U Pa J
Intl Econ L 637 (2002). But see US Chamber of Commerce, Press Release: U.S. Chamber Warns
China on Counte feiiing & Piracy: Requests USTR Initiate W/TO Consultations (Feb 10, 2005), available
online at <http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2005/february/05-21.htm> (visited May
7, 2006) (regarding request to US Trade Representative to comment on WTO consultations
regarding piracy and asserting that "the scope of copyright piracy and counterfeiting violations
worsened in 2004").
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incentives Chinese high technology enterprises have to innovate and could deny
such enterprises access to technologies critical for competing in the global
market. Such a situation would be detrimental to Chinese consumers and would,
more broadly, hamper continuing efforts to expand the Chinese economy.
In any event, the consequences of an abuse of IP rights should be
delineated. For example, would such consequences include nullification of the
rights or compulsory licensing? l° Recent decisions in various jurisdictions have
rekindled serious concerns about the protection of intellectual property rights
21
during the latest profusion of new antitrust laws. '
Other supplementary provisions in Chapter VII include Article 47, which
makes the AML applicable to business groups and industrial associations that
eliminate or restrict market competition in violation of the law. Although such
broad language could be interpreted as applying to administrative monopolies, it
is highly unlikely that this is the intended construction. Instead, this provision
will probably apply to trade associations, chambers of commerce, and other
business-related groups. Chinese government entities are heavily involved in
many Chinese business organizations, raising the possibility that Article 47 could
render the law applicable to such quasi-government entities in spite of the
Current Draft AMiL's exclusion of the chapter on administrative monopolies.
Article 49 of the Current Draft AML provides that the law is not applicable
to the "cooperation, association or other coincident conduct by farmers and
the farmers' professional economic organizations during the course of the
production, manufacture, transportation, storage and other operating activities
of the agricultural products." This is the only sectoral exemption in the Current
Draft AML (if one excludes Article 2's exemption for conduct covered by laws
or administrative regulations of relevant industries or sectors). The exemption is
broader than the Capper Volstead Act's 212 immunity for agricultural cooperatives
under US law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Overall, China has approached the drafting of its Anti-Monopoly Law with
remarkable openness and a willingness to hear and consider the views and
experiences of Chinese experts as well as foreign antitrust agencies, academics,
economists, and practitioners. The improvements in the Current Draft AML
210
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See Adam Cohen, Cbina's DraftAntitrust Law Sows Worries in the West, Wall St J A12 (Jan 30, 2006)
(describing concerns of the world's largest patent-holding companies and the possibility of forced
royalty-free licensing).
See generally Abbott B. Lipsky Jr., To the Edge: Maintaining Incentives for Innovation after the Global
AntitrustExplosions, 35 Geo J Ind L 521 (2004).
7 USC §§ 291-292 (2000).
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reflect the value of that deliberative, serious process. However, as noted in this
Article, serious concerns remain, many of which could be ameliorated through
implementing regulations that clarified the AML's substantive and procedural
provisions. But some of the problematic revisions, especially the removal of
provisions curbing administrative monopolies and the introduction of provisions
empowering sectoral regulators to serve as the primary interpreters and
enforcers of the law in certain sectors, can only be rectified through a revision of
the draft law or subsequent legislation. The apparent inapplicability, at least
initially, of normative competition rules to SOEs and significant sectors of the
Chinese economy, and the feared non-normative interpretation and application
of the proposed law's substantive provisions, threaten to deprive Chinese
consumers (and more broadly, the Chinese economy) of the benefits that would
follow if the law's principal goals were achieved. The AML's ambitious objective
is to foster a broad market-based restructuring of China's economic system, and
the concomitant benefits of implementing the AML would include the further
development of the rule of law, an increase in the economic welfare of workers,
social stability in an expanding economy, and the continuing attraction of
foreign capital. One step toward reaping these rewards would be clarifying the
provision regarding possible violations of the new law by virtue of undefined
"abuses" of intellectual property rights. Otherwise, a contraction in investment
in China's high technology markets and a forestalling in the licensing of leading
technologies to Chinese enterprises can be expected.
Despite these shortcomings of the Current Draft AML, the need for
continuing support of China's competition law initiatives is clear. It is difficult to
overstate the potential importance, to China and the world economy, of China's
adoption, implementation, and rigorous and fair enforcement of a modern
competition law. China's remarkable economic expansion, and the consequent
progress made by many of its people and enterprises, is a testament to the
investment Chinese leaders have made in modernity and a market economy. The
continuation of such growth will require a broader reliance on a market
economy along with fair and transparent rules of competition that apply to all
sectors of the Chinese economy, including administrative monopolies and many
sectors now subject to special laws and regulations. To do less would imperil the
many social benefits gained to date through modern economic reforms and
would undermine the execution of China's bold commitment to transition from
a planned economy to a market economy. Although many developments are
possible, and the Current Draft AML is less ambitious than had been hoped, it
nevertheless provides grounds for cautious optimism and an incentive for all
interested antitrust enforcers, businesses with interests in China, competition law
academics, and practitioners to remain engaged in constructive dialogue with
relevant Chinese agencies and officials.
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